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Introduction
Access to finance is a key driver of economic growth.1 It allows firms to fund both long-
term investments and working capital, thereby spurring economic activity. In addition,
well-functioning financial markets ensure that funding is allocated to the most profitable
investment opportunities in an economy, which leads to a maximisation of social welfare.
History, however, has shown that failures in financial markets come at enormous costs.
During the financial crisis of 2007-09, for example, many banks ceased to lend and re-
searchers, politicians, and practitioners bemoaned that a credit crunch was hampering
economic growth.2 Governments responded immediately with different policy measures
to secure banks’ liquidity and ensure that credit continued to flow to the real sector; for
instance, bail-out funds for banks were set up and the levels of deposit insurance coverage
were increased. Drawing these measures effectively requires a deep understanding of a
credit crunch and its impact on the economy.
Empirical research on the causes and consequences of credit constraints provides a solid
foundation for designing the right policy measures in response to a credit crunch. In
particular, firm-level data allows in-depth analyses along several lines. Which kinds of
impairments of credit finance do firms face due to a credit crunch? Even if credit is
granted to firms and credit volumes remain stable, do firms suffer from a deterioration of
terms and conditions under which they can borrow (e.g., higher interest rates or collateral
requirements)? Does firm behaviour alleviate impairments of credit finance? Do firms
1See King and Levine (1993), Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beck,
Levine, and Loayza (2000), Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Maksimovic (2005).
2In April 2008, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that a credit crunch in subsequent
quarters could slow down year-on-year GDP growth in the U.S. by 1.4 percentage points (International
Monetary Fund (2008), p. 35).
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react to credit constraints by using other sources of finance? What are the consequences
of credit constraints with respect to real economic activity? Are these real effects caused
by credit supply-side factors (e.g., banks ceasing to lend because of liquidity constraints)
or by credit demand-side factors (e.g., firms’ deteriorating creditworthiness)?
This dissertation addresses these questions by providing three empirical analyses of credit
constraints at the firm-level. Chapter 1 shows which kinds of impairments of credit finance
firms experienced due to the financial crisis of 2007-09 and whether the risk of facing them
was lowered by relationship banking (i.e. the concentration of bank business on a small
number of closely connected banks). Chapter 2 assesses firms’ behaviour under credit
constraints by testing whether they use “Family & Friends” (F&F) finance in response
to unsuccessful bank credit negotiations. Finally, Chapter 3 analyses whether the link
between credit constraints and real economic activity is caused by credit supply-side
factors, or if constrained credit supply is just a mirror picture of firm-side factors that
actually hamper real economic activity.
When analysing a credit crunch, it is crucial to understand which symptoms firms could
face and how firms’ behaviour can help alleviate these. For example, firms can resolve
asymmetric information by establishing a close bank relationship to secure access to bank
credit (Sharpe, 1990; von Thadden, 2004). This could be of particular importance during
times of financial crisis, when high levels of uncertainty keep banks from lending at all or
make them do so according to terms and conditions that are less favourable to the firm.
Chapter 1 provides evidence of different kinds of impairments of firms’ credit finance
due to the financial crisis of 2007-09. The data stems from a survey that was conducted
among German firms in September 2011. In the survey, firms indicate which impairments
of credit finance they have faced and they report their number of main bank relationships
as a measure of relationship banking. Estimations show that relationship banking lowers
a firm’s risk of facing higher information requirements by banks. It also lowers the risk
of facing worse non-price terms of credit (i.e. shorter maturities and higher collateral
requirements). However, relationship banking does not affect the probability of experi-
encing constrained credit availability. Finally, the results are mixed with respect to the
impact of relationship banking on the risk of facing higher interest rates due to the finan-
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cial crisis. The diverging effects of relationship banking on different impairments suggest
that soft information, which banks gather over the course of a customer relationship,
influences the negotiation of price-terms and non-price terms of credit, but not a bank’s
credit granting decision.
The key contribution of Chapter 1 stems from the fact that the survey data captures
all kinds of impairments within one analysis. In contrast, estimating the impact of
relationship banking on loan contract data restricts analyses to firms to which credit was
granted and neglects situations in which no credit contract is completed. The analysis of
data on rejected credit applications as a measure of credit availability solves this problem,
but is limited to firms that have applied for credit. This approach does not account for
firms that do not apply for credit because they expect negotiations to be unsuccessful.
The analysis in Chapter 1 does not face any of these limitations. Asking firms in a
perception-based approach which kinds of impairments of credit finance they have faced
allows a broad analysis of the effects of relationship banking.
Besides analysing the symptoms of a credit crunch, the question of how firms’ behaviour
changes in response to credit constraints must be raised. For example, firms could have
a tendency to move into other sources of finance. One of these could be informal finance
when sources of formal funding dry up. This is particularly worrying because it keeps
potential welfare gains of financial intermediation from being realised and increases firms’
borrowing costs (Djankov, Lieberman, Mukherjee, and Nenova, 2003). The use of infor-
mal finance has been analysed in previous empirical studies for developing economies
and for start-up businesses in developed countries. However, the question of whether es-
tablished firms in highly developed economies also turn to informal finance when facing
credit constraints has been widely neglected in empirical research.
Chapter 2 fills this gap by using a sample of mostly established firms from Germany,
a highly developed economy, to analyse whether firms use “Family & Friends” (F&F)
finance as a substitute for unsuccessfully negotiated bank credit. In the survey that is
also used for the analysis in Chapter 1, firms report whether they receive funding from
F&F related to the business (“F&F Business”) and from F&F privately connected to the
entrepreneur (“F&F Private”). Firms also indicate if their most recent negotiations with
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banks on a line of credit and/or a loan led to credit being granted. Estimations show that
firms use both kinds of F&F finance in response to unsuccessful bank loan negotiations.
They do not, however, use it as a substitute for unsuccessfully negotiated lines of credit.
Therefore, F&F finance is more important in financing particular investment projects
than in working capital finance.
Apart from containing seminal evidence on the use of F&F finance among established
firms in Germany, Chapter 2 provides key contributions in the empirical analysis of firms’
behaviour under credit constraints. Endogeneity issues are resolved using an instrumental
variables estimation approach and sample selection issues are addressed. This stands in
contrast to previous literature, which primarily provides evidence on the correlations
between the use of informal finance and different firm characteristics.
Knowing that firms’ credit finance is impaired, the question arises as to how this affects
real economic activity. It is commonly acknowledged that real economic activity and
credit market conditions are intertwined (e.g., Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996)).
At the firm-level, a correlation between business activity and the experience of credit
constraints has two potential explanations. First, credit supply shocks (e.g., a dry-up in
the interbank market) could make potential lenders unable to meet firms’ credit demand.
Without access to credit, firms must postpone investments or reduce their business ac-
tivity, which leads to lower real economic activity. Second, firm-side factors (e.g., failed
business models) could contribute to the slowdown of real economic activity, and banks’
reluctance to lend to firms could be a mirror picture of the firms’ lack of creditworthi-
ness. Therefore, economic activity could in fact not be hampered exclusively by credit
supply-side factors, but also by firm-side factors.
Chapter 3 analyses the question of how to rule out bias from firm-side factors in the esti-
mation of the real effects of credit supply using firm-level data for Germany between 2003
and 2011. The results show that a failure to control for firms’ current business situation
and future expectations leads to a significant overestimation of credit supply-side effects
on real economic activity. In the analysis, a treatment variable indicating constrained
credit supply at the firm-level is derived from monthly survey data measuring a firm’s
perception of bank lending supply. To estimate the treatment effect of constrained credit
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supply, firms’ monthly changes in production and annual employment growth are used
as outcome variables. When controlling for balance sheet variables only, estimations sug-
gest that constrained credit supply reduces real economic activity. This effect, however,
is significantly reduced when adding survey-based control variables that explicitly cap-
ture firms’ current business situation and future expectations. In several specifications,
the effect even turns insignificant, which suggests that there is no evidence for credit
supply-side effects on real economic activity in the data analysed here.
Chapter 3 therefore provides insights into how survey data contributes to the estimation
of real effects of credit supply. The results underline that the sole reliance on balance
sheet data could lead to incorrect conclusions about the causes and consequences of credit
constraints. The shown importance of holding constant contemporaneous and forward-
looking credit demand-side factors should be considered in empirical studies estimating
the real effects of credit supply.
In summary, this dissertation provides valuable insights into how firm-level data allows
the application of advanced econometric methods to draw the correct conclusions with
respect to policies in response to credit constraints during times of financial crisis. For ex-
ample, firm-level data can be used to assess how the resolution of asymmetric information
between banks and firms helps alleviate credit financing impairments. This could affect
the decision on regulatory measures affecting the flow of information between firms and
banks. For instance, requiring banks to base their credit granting decisions on hard facts
about the firm could crowd out positive effects of soft information gathered from relation-
ship banking. Furthermore, firm-level data offers unique opportunities to analyse how
firms behave under credit constraints. This allows policy makers to react to behaviour
that could lead to welfare losses such as firms widely borrowing from unregulated finan-
cial institutions or using informal finance as a substitute for bank credit. Finally, the
decision whether to take measures addressing banks or firms depends on whether credit
constraints are driven by credit supply-side or firm-side factors. For this purpose, firm-
level data provides crucial control variables in the analysis of credit constraints and their
impact on real economic activity. This dissertation contributes to research along these
lines by applying different micro-econometric approaches to seminal firm-level data.
5
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Chapter 1
Relationship Banking During the
Financial Crisis: Through Which
Channels Did It Work?∗
1.1 Introduction
Firms’ access to credit finance is impeded by asymmetric information. Banks face prob-
lems of adverse selection and moral hazard when they lend to firms. These problems were
aggravated by the recent financial crisis when firms operated under increasing uncertainty.
In some countries, this arguably contributed to a severe credit crunch.1 Especially during
times of tight credit supply, it is crucial to understand whether firms have less problems
with credit finance when they concentrate their bank business on a small number of
closely connected banks (“relationship banking”) instead of spreading it over a larger
number of banks without establishing close ties (“transactional banking”). In particular,
we raise the question which kinds of impairments of credit finance due to the financial
crisis can be alleviated by relationship banking.
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Christa Hainz.
1For empirical analyses of banks’ credit supply during the financial crisis, see, for example, Ivashina
and Scharfstein (2010), Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen (2011a), Popov and Udell (2012), deYoung, Gron,
Torna, and Winton (2014), and Jimènez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina (2012).
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So far, empirical studies have analysed different channels of relationship banking in iso-
lation. Its impact on interest rates and non-price terms of bank credit can be analysed
using data from credit contracts. Such data, however, inhibits the analysis of credit
availability because it only considers situations in which credit is granted. Estimating
the effects of relationship banking on the probability of credit approvals addresses this
issue, but it does not account for firms that did not apply for credit in the first place
because they expect the application to be rejected, for example.
To capture all potential channels of relationship banking, we use survey data to estimate
the effect of relationship banking on four different kinds of impairments of firms’ credit
finance: higher information requirements by banks, constrained credit availability, in-
creased interest rates, and deteriorated non-price terms of credit. To this end, we shed
light on the channels through which relationship banking works. Our analysis is based
on data from the Ifo “Financing of the German Economy” survey, which encompasses
1,139 firms from the German manufacturing sector. Using German data is beneficial for
this analysis because relationship banking is widespread among German firms and the
German manufacturing sector relies heavily on funding from banks. In the survey, each
firm reports which kinds of impairments of credit finance it faced due to the financial
crisis between 2007 and 2009. A firm’s number of main banks serves as a measure of rela-
tionship banking, with firms that have only one main bank being considered as following
the concept of relationship banking in the narrowest sense.
Our analysis first shows that implementing relationship banking by having only one main
bank significantly lowers the probability of higher information requirements by banks
and the deterioration of non-price terms (i.e. shorter maturities and higher collateral
requirements) due to the financial crisis. Second, the effect of relationship banking on
the likelihood of increased interest rates is ambiguous as the risk of this impairment is even
lower for firms with two main banks than for those with only one. Finally, relationship
banking does not reduce the probability of a firm facing constrained credit availability.
To estimate these effects without bias from unobserved heterogeneity, we use a large set
of variables to control for other firm-side and bank-side factors.
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Although contradictory at first sight, these results can be explained by the role of hard
and soft information at different stages of bank credit negotiations. Over the last decades,
technological progress and bank regulation induced banks to base their lending decisions
primarily on credit scores, which are based on hard information.2 Therefore, the provision
of soft information through relationship banking is no longer affecting a firm’s credit
availability. If credit is granted, however, the negotiation of the terms and conditions of
credit is still affected by the soft information from relationship banking.
Our analysis is most closely related to studies using the number of bank relationships as
a measure of relationship banking. In line with our results, Petersen and Rajan (1994)
find that a large number of bank relationships increases quoted interest rates. Their
analysis is based on U.S. data from the 1987 National Survey of Small Business Finances
(NSSBF). Harhoff and Körting (1998) ran a survey similar to the NSSBF among German
firms in 1997. They do not find that the number of bank relationships has an impact on
interest rates, but provide evidence that a larger number of bank relationships increases
the probability that a firm has to pledge collateral, which is in line with our findings.
Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Harhoff and Körting (1998) both find that the availability
of credit is improved if a firm maintains a smaller number of bank relationships. They
measure credit availability indirectly using late payments of trade credit (Petersen and
Rajan, 1994) and fast payment discounts not taken (Harhoff and Körting, 1998), arguing
that trade credit, the most expensive source of finance for a firm, will only be used if no
other source (i.e. bank credit) is accessible. Cole (1998) and Cole, Goldberg, and White
(2004) use the 1993 NSSBF to show that a large number of bank relationships lowers the
probability that credit is granted by a bank, which constitutes a more direct measure of
credit availability.
Other studies use different measures of relationship banking to analyse its impact on
credit availability, interest rates, and collateral. Several studies use the length of a rela-
2For loans exceeding e750,000, banks in Germany are obliged to make a firm disclose its balance
sheets. Furthermore, Basel II bank regulation provided incentives for banks to use ratings to assess the
borrower’s creditworthiness in order to reduce capital charges (Behn, Haselmann, and Vig, 2014).
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tionship,3 others use the scope of products that the firm receives from a bank4 to measure
relationship banking. In addition, Cole (1998) and Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srini-
vasan (2011) use a dummy variable indicating a pre-existing business relationship and
Lehmann and Neuberger (2001) use bank-level data to identify relationship banking by
asking the bank whether it considers itself to be the main bank of a firm. Overall, these
studies do not show a clear effect of relationship banking on credit finance. All these
measures of relationship banking focus on features of an individual bank relationship.
In contrast, the number of main bank relationships captures a firm’s whole portfolio of
bank relationships and therefore provides a broader measure of a firm’s attitude towards
relationship banking.
Furthermore, our analysis relates to studies that analyse the impact of relationship bank-
ing on firms’ credit finance during times of financial crisis. For the financial crisis of
2007-09, Jimènez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina (2012) show that a longer bank relation-
ship increased a firm’s probability of getting a loan during the crisis in Spain. Bolton,
Freixas, Gambacorta, and Mistrulli (2013) confirm this for Italy and show that relation-
ship banks charge lower interest rates in crisis times. Using data for Korea during the
period of 1997-98, Bae, Kang, and Lim (2002) show that a firm’s market value is af-
fected by the deteriorating financial health of their main banks. Similarly, Yamori and
Murakami (1999) examine the failure of a Japanese bank and its effect on the stock
prices of the bank’s client firms, thereby evaluating the economic value of the main bank
relationship.5
We contribute to the literature in important ways to estimate the effects of relationship
banking on credit finance. First, we use a perception-based approach to measure impair-
ments of firms’ credit finance, an approach that is also used by Campello, Graham, and
Harvey (2010), for example. This allows us to analyse the effects of relationship banking
3See Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), Harhoff and Körting (1998), Cole (1998),
Degryse and van Cayseele (2000), Lehmann and Neuberger (2001), Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and
Srinivasan (2011), and Santikian (2014).
4See Petersen and Rajan (1994), Harhoff and Körting (1998), Degryse and van Cayseele (2000), Cole,
Goldberg, and White (2004), and Santikian (2014).
5Several other studies estimate the effects of bank health on client firms during financial crises, but do
not look at the particular role of relationship banking in this concern (see, for example, Brewer, Genay,
Hunter, and Kaufman (2003), Kang and Stulz (2000), and Ongena, Smith, and Michalsen (2003)).
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on different aspects of credit finance within one study. In particular, the impact on the
probability of higher information requirements by banks has not been analysed in previ-
ous studies, although this shows most directly whether relationship banking influences the
flow of information between a firm and its banks. Furthermore, firms’ perceptions pro-
vide comprehensive measures of impairments of credit finance because firms’ decisions in
response to these impairments (e.g., the cancellation of investment projects) may depend
on their perceptions, and not just on factual outcomes of credit negotiations. Second,
we amend existing literature by using a firm’s number of main banks as a measure of
relationship banking, because this is a more precise measure than the number of business
relationships to banks in general.
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 1.2, we derive four testable predictions
about how relationship banking could affect a firm’s credit finance. Section 1.3 provides
information about the data set, our measures of relationship banking, and impairments
of credit finance. We show estimation results in Section 1.4 and robustness checks in
Section 1.5 before presenting our conclusions in Section 1.6.
1.2 Hypotheses
Based on theoretical models, we build hypotheses about the impact of relationship bank-
ing on four kinds of impairments of a firm’s credit finance: higher information require-
ments by banks, constrained credit availability, increased interest rates, and deteriorated
non-price terms. For the design of policy measures, it is important to figure out which of
these impairments relationship banking alleviates.
First, we expect that banks are less likely to require further information when they
are closely tied to the firm through relationship banking. During ex ante screening and
interim monitoring, banks often require firms to provide information, which induces costs.
For example, the provision of interim financial statements and business plans to a bank
is highly burdensome, especially for small firms. This may be particularly prevalent in
times of a financial crisis, when banks require more information as uncertainty increases
considerably. The theoretical literature argues that a flow of information about the firm
11
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is adjunct to loan contracts (Fama, 1985; Sharpe, 1990), and more generally to all kinds
of interactions. If this was the case and if such information helped a bank monitor the
firm, relationship banking should imply the provision of information, thereby lowering
the probability of additional information requirements by banks. Furthermore, as banks
also gain from relationship banking, they may put more effort into processing existing
information instead of requiring additional ones from their customers.
Hypothesis 1: Relationship banking lowers the probability of higher information re-
quirements by banks due to the financial crisis.
Second, we expect relationship banking to improve a firm’s credit availability. Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) present a theoretical model in which asymmetric information leads to
credit rationing. Consequently, the resolution of asymmetric information through rela-
tionship banking should improve a firm’s access to bank credit. Thakor (1996), however,
argues that approaching a large number of banks for credit leads to ambiguous effects on
overall credit availability. Although the likelihood that at least one bank will grant credit
is higher when many banks are approached, each bank’s expected profit from screening
declines. Therefore, each bank, knowing a firm’s optimal application strategy, is more
likely to save the screening effort and ration credit when a firm approaches a large number
of banks. During the financial crisis, we expect another aspect to affect a firm’s credit
availability: banks with constrained lending capacities might first lend to firms about
which they are best informed. The risk of ending the relationship and destroying “in-
formational capital” accumulated over the course of the relationship may keep the bank
from constraining credit to a relationship borrower.
Hypothesis 2: Relationship banking lowers the probability that the availability of bank
credit is constrained due to the financial crisis.
Third, with respect to interest rates, the predictions for the impact of relationship banking
are somewhat ambiguous. Relationship banks clearly have an informational advantage
compared to outside lenders, which gives them an incentive to extract an informational
rent from proprietary information (“hold-up problem”). According to Sharpe (1990) and
Petersen and Rajan (1995), banks grant lower rates to young firms, and increase them
12
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later in the course of the relationship. Thereby, loan contracts do not necessarily break
even in every period because both parties agree on (implicit) long-term contracts. Boot
and Thakor (1994), however, argue that interest rates decrease over time as banks learn
about the quality of a firm and can commit to granting lower rates. Assuming limited
monopoly power of the relationship lender, the model by Bolton, Freixas, Gambacorta,
and Mistrulli (2013) predicts that relationship banks charge higher interest rates than
transactional banks in good times and lower interest rates in bad times.
Hypothesis 3: Relationship banking lowers the probability that interest rates increase
due to the financial crisis.
Finally, relationship banking should render the non-price terms of credit less stringent for
the firm, although non-price terms differ in nature from the interest rate.6 With respect
to collateral, Inderst and Müller (2007) obtain this result in a model in which a local
relationship lender has an informational advantage vis-a-vis transactional lenders. They
show that this advantage lowers the lender’s collateral requirements. Another aspect
of collateral is that it can only fulfill its role of mitigating moral hazard and adverse
selection problems if the value of the collateral can be observed by the bank (Rajan and
Winton, 1995). Relationship banking leads to proximity between a bank and the firm,
which improves the bank’s ability to assess the value of the collateral (Boot, 2000). Less
uncertainty about the collateral value could lower the overall requirement.
Hypothesis 4: Relationship banking lowers the probability that non-price terms of
credit contracts are impaired due to the financial crisis.
6While the interest rate induces a pecuniary transfer from the borrower to the bank, non-price terms
(such as maturity and collateral requirements) are an outcome of the risk-sharing between the contract
parties.
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1.3 Data
1.3.1 The Data Set
The following analysis tests the four hypotheses concerning the channels of relationship
banking based on data from the Ifo “Financing of the German Economy” survey, the
Bureau van Dyk (BvD) Amadeus, and the BvD Bankscope database. The Ifo “Financing
of the German Economy” survey was based on a written questionnaire, which was sent to a
sample of CFOs of German manufacturing firms in September 2011.7 All firms are part of
the address database of the Ifo Investment Survey for which the Ifo Institute continuously
ensures representativeness of the sample of addressees for the German manufacturing
sector. In total, 1,139 firms participated in the survey. The response rate was close to
25 percent, leading to a sample in which small firms (less than 50 employees), medium-
sized firms (50-249 employees), and large firms (more than 249 employees) are evenly
represented.
German manufacturing firms represent an ideal environment to test our hypotheses for
two reasons. First, they are highly dependent on bank credit. According to Hainz and
Wiegand (2013), 72.9 percent of the firms in the survey reported that they use bank
credit. Second, the concept of having a main bank is deeply rooted in the bank-based
German economy (see Section 1.3.3). The number of main banks therefore provides an
accurate measure of a firm’s degree of following the concept of relationship banking.
The Ifo “Financing of the German Economy” survey data is particularly suited to analyse
the channels of relationship banking because it contains both a firm’s number of main
bank relationships and perception-based information on which kinds of impairments of
credit finance that firms have experienced due to the financial crisis. In addition, firm
and bank balance sheet data from the BvD Amadeus and the BvD Bankscope database
provide a large set of control variables. All variables used in the following analysis are
described in Table 1.1.
7During the six months prior to the survey, personal meetings with executives were scheduled to
conduct pre-tests to rule out that the survey design was subject to problems arising from response
behaviour. The pre-test talks were also used to ensure that the possible answers listed in the questionnaire
captured the firms’ reality.
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Table 1.1: Variable descriptions
Variable Description
Impaired Firm answered the following question with yes: “Was
the credit finance of your firm impaired by the financial
crisis between 2007 and 2009?”
Information Higher information requirements from banks
Reduction Reduction of existing lines of credit
Availability Constrained availability of new loans or lines of credit
Interest Increase in interest rates for existing loans or lines of
credit
Maturities Bank credit was offered only at shorter maturities
Collateral Banks required more collateral
Main bank Number of main banks
Employees Number of employees (in heads) at the end of 2010
Assets Total assets
Equity Equity/Assets
Long-term debt Long-term debt/Assets
Cash Cash / Assets
Return EBIT / Turnover
Earlypay Cash discounts drawn / Cash discounts offered to firm
Age Firm age in years, based on year of foundation
Incorporated Firm is a corporation by its legal status
Ext. rating Firm has external rating besides banks’ internal ones
Group Firm is part of a group company
Family Largest shareholder is a single person or family
Export Firm generates turnover abroad
Concentration Share of business that is conducted with the three most
important customers
Sources: Ifo “Financing of the German Economy” survey, BvD Amadeus database.
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1.3.2 Impairments of Credit Finance
The survey question about impairments of credit finance due to the financial crisis started
by asking firms: “Was the credit finance of your firm impaired by the financial crisis
between 2007 and 2009?”. The descriptive statistics for the dummy variable Impaired in
Table 1.2 indicate that about 22 percent of the firms in the sample answered this question
with “Yes”.
Table 1.2: Impairment of credit finance due to the financial crisis
N Freq. Perc. Min Max
Impaired 1,062 235 22.13% 0 1
Information 1,046 153 14.63% 0 1
Reduction 1,046 75 7.17% 0 1
Availability 1,046 114 10.90% 0 1
Interest 1,046 112 10.71% 0 1
Maturities 1,046 27 2.58% 0 1
Collateral 1,046 103 9.85% 0 1
Other 1,046 50 4.78% 0 1
Note: The table shows descriptive statistics for all kinds of impairments of credit finance due to the
financial crisis; Impaired equals one if a firm answered the following question with yes: “Was the credit
finance of your firm impaired by the financial crisis between 2007 and 2009?”, and zero if a firm answered
the question with no; all other variables equal one if a firm has reported the respective impairment and
zero if not; firms could report more than one impairment.
To shed light on the channels through which relationship banking works, firms with
impaired credit finance were asked what kinds of impairments they experienced due to
the financial crisis. The possible answers are listed in the lower part of Table 1.2.
First, the dummy variable Information indicates that a firm faced higher information
requirements by banks (Hypothesis 1). This impairment was reported by over 14 percent
of the firms, which makes it the most frequent of all. Second, variables indicating a
reduction of existing lines of credit (Reduction) and constrained availability of new loans
or lines of credit (Availability) are used as measures of constrained credit availability
(Hypothesis 2). These impairments were reported by 7 percent and 11 percent of the
firms, respectively. Third, Interest indicates an increase in the interest rate for an existing
loan or line of credit (Hypothesis 3). Almost 11 percent of the firms faced this impair-
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ment. Finally, the dummy variables Maturities and Collateral are used to measure the
probability of non-price terms and conditions of bank credit being impaired (Hypothesis
4). The former variable indicates that banks offered credit only for shorter maturities
(reported by less than 3 percent of the firms), the latter indicates that banks requested
more collateral (reported by almost 10 percent of the firms).
1.3.3 Measuring Relationship Banking
Based on the following theoretical foundation, we use a firm’s number of main bank
relationships to measure the extent to which it follows the concept of relationship banking.
Boot (2000) defines two conditions for relationship banking to be present:8
1. Multiple interactions between a bank and its customer over time or across products,
through which the bank gathers soft information about the customer.
2. The information gathered is non-public and remains proprietary to the bank.
We argue that these conditions are fulfilled for firms with one main bank, whereas having
a larger number of main banks violates the conditions in the following two ways. First,
a larger number of main banks indicates that a firm spreads its business among different
banks. Consequently, each single bank runs less business with the firm and therefore
learns less about it, which violates Condition 1. Second, if there is a larger number of
main banks gathering information from interactions with the firm, this information can
no longer be considered to be proprietary to each bank, which contradicts Condition 2.
Therefore, firms with a larger number of main banks do not apply relationship banking
as defined by Boot (2000).
Our focus on main bank relationships amends the approach of using the number of banks
from which a firm receives financial services as a measure of relationship banking9. The
number of main banks is a much clearer signal of relationship banking than business
8The “learning theory” of relationship banking contains both elements and is modelled by Bolton,
Freixas, Gambacorta, and Mistrulli (2013).
9For studies using the number of business relationships to banks as a measure of relationship bank-
ing, see, for example, Petersen and Rajan (1994), Harhoff and Körting (1998), Cole (1998), and Cole,
Goldberg, and White (2004).
17
Relationship Banking during the Financial Crisis
relationships to banks in general and therefore gives us a more stringent view of a firm’s
attitude towards relationship banking. In addition, our study is based on information
provided by the firm. This provides a better insight than data from banks’ perceptions on
whether they consider themselves to be the main bank of a firm (Elsas, 2005; Lehmann
and Neuberger, 2001).10
Table 1.3 shows the distribution of the number of main banks of the firms in the sample.
The largest share of firms (40.4 percent) follows the principle of relationship banking by
having only one main bank, which underlines the importance of the main bank concept
for German firms. 37 percent of the firms have two main banks. About 22 percent,
however, report that they do not have a main bank at all or that they have three and
more main banks. For the following empirical analysis, these two groups of firms are
defined as not following the concept of relationship banking.
Furthermore, impairments of firms’ credit finance due to the financial crisis are linked to
the number of main bank relationships in Table 1.3. The fraction of firms whose credit
finance was impaired by the financial crisis is lowest among firms with one main bank
(15.7 percent). The fraction is slightly higher among firms with a second main bank (21
percent) and by far highest among firms with zero or three and more (30.6 percent). The
probability of higher information requirements by banks is smallest for firms that apply
relationship banking. For the reduction of existing lines of credit, however, there are
hardly any differences between firms with different numbers of main banks. Increased
interest rates are the least likely for firms with two main banks, while the likelihood of
deteriorated non-price terms is lowest for firms with one main bank.
These descriptive statistics provide initial evidence showing that the gains from relation-
ship banking seem to outweigh the benefits from creating a competitive situation between
a large number of banks. The probabilities of different kinds of impairments of credit
finance, however, appear to be not equally affected by relationship banking.
10To gain an impression of what exactly a main bank is for a firm, the data set provides information
on whether certain features characterise the two most important bank relationships and if the respective
bank is a main bank. This leads to a sample of over 1,600 main bank relationships for which features are
listed in Table A.2 in the Appendix. The most important criteria for main banks are the long duration of
a relationship, personal support by the bank, and the short distance between the headquarter of the firm
and the bank. Only 32 percent of the firms report that the main bank is the most important creditor.
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Table 1.3: Relationship banking and impaired credit finance
Main bank (1) Main bank (2) Main bank (0/3+)
N 1,042 1,042 1,042
Freq. 421 386 235
Perc. 40.40% 37.04% 22.55%
Impaired 15.68% 20.98% 30.64%
Information 9.03% 15.28% 23.83%
Reduction 5.94% 8.03% 8.09%
Availability 8.08% 11.92% 14.47%
Interest 8.55% 8.29% 18.72%
Maturities 0.95% 2.85% 5.11%
Collateral 6.65% 11.40% 13.19%
Others 3.33% 4.66% 7.66%
Note: The table shows descriptive statistics for firms’ number of main banks and all kinds of impairments
of credit finance due to the financial crisis; Impaired equals one if a firm answered the following question
with yes: “Was the credit finance of your firm impaired by the financial crisis between 2007 and 2009?”,
and zero if a firm answered the question with no; all other variables equal one if a firm has reported the
respective impairment and zero if not; firms could report more than one impairment.
1.3.4 Control Variables for Firm Characteristics
To rule out that the correlation between relationship banking and impairments of firms’
credit finance is driven by hitherto unobserved firm characteristics, the following estima-
tions incorporate a set of control variables from survey data and firms’ balance sheets.
We expect these to determine both a firm’s creditworthiness and its attitude towards
relationship banking. All variables are listed and summarised in Table 1.4.
First, the variables log(Employees) and log(Assets) in Table 1.4 show that firms that
apply relationship banking are smaller than firms that do not. Firm size is also widely
acknowledged to affect a firm’s access to credit. Large firms often have demand for
large scale funding. Access to large amounts of credit may be difficult when banks are
short of lending capacities and want to diversify their risk exposure across several firms,
rather than clustering risks by granting large loans to few firms. On the other hand,
asymmetric information might be lower for large firms as they are typically older and
more transparent, which could lower the risk of impaired credit finance.
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Furthermore, a broad set of variables to control for a firm’s financial situation constitute
the most obvious predictors of impaired credit finance. Table 1.4, however, does not
provide a clear picture of the correlation between a firm’s financial situation and its
attitude towards relationship banking.
Table 1.4: Firm characteristics and relationship banking
Main bank (1) Main bank (2) Main bank (0/3+)
(N=271) (N=254) (N=134)
log(Employees) 4.2 4.4 5.9
log(Assets) 8.5 8.8 10.4
Equity 31.48% 34.39% 34.69%
Long-term debt 28.00% 25.80% 21.40%
Cash 10.22% 12.39% 8.85%
Return (<3%) 42.80% 37.80% 47.01%
Return (3% to <7%) 33.21% 38.19% 35.07%
Return (7% to <10%) 16.24% 14.57% 9.70%
Return (10% +) 7.75% 9.45% 8.21%
Earlypay (0%) 3.32% 3.15% 5.22%
Earlypay (0% to <25%) 18.08% 11.81% 12.6â€š9%
Earlypay (25% to <50%) 11.07% 13.39% 5.97%
Earlypay (50% to <75%) 12.92% 9.45% 14.93%
Earlypay (75% +) 54.61% 62.20% 61.19%
log(Age) 3.9 4.1 4.2
Incorporated 69.74% 64.17% 70.15%
Ext. rating 20.66% 20.47% 21.64%
Group 25.83% 26.38% 42.54%
Family 79.70% 84.65% 76.87%
Export 85.24% 87.40% 90.30%
Concentration (<10%) 15.50% 13.78% 26.87%
Concentration (10% to <30%) 49.08% 46.46% 42.54%
Concentration (30% to <50%) 18.45% 25.20% 16.42%
Concentration (50% +) 16.97% 14.57% 14.18%
Note: The table shows descriptive statistics for all firm characteristics that are used as control variables
in the estimations in this study; see Table 1.1 for a description of all variables.
For the balance sheet variables Equity, Long-term debt, and Cash, we calculate the average
value of the balance sheets in 2007, 2008, and 2009 in order to capture a firm’s financial
situation during the entire financial crisis. Data on return on sales (Return) and taken
early payment discounts (Earlypay) are only available in categorical variables so that we
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have to use the respective variables in 2008 as control variables, instead of calculating
average values of the three crisis years.
In addition to firm size and balance sheet variables, survey data provides additional con-
trol variables for firm age (log(Age)), transparency (Incorporated, Ext. rating), ownership
(Group, Family), and export status. All these variables are commonly used as predictors
of firms’ access to credit finance. Table 1.4 shows that firms that implement relationship
banking do not differ much in age and transparency from those that do not, but the
latter are more likely to belong to a group company, less likely to be family-owned, and
less likely to export.
Finally, the concentration of bank business on one main bank could be driven by a firm’s
risk preferences. We approximate this with the share of a firm’s business that is con-
centrated on the three most important customers (Concentration). Table 1.4 shows that
firms that concentrate business on one main bank also have a high customer concentra-
tion, whereas firms that do not do so also spread their own business across customers.
1.3.5 Control Variables for Bank Characteristics
Estimating the effects of relationship banking on impairments of credit finance raises the
need to control for bank-side effects. Empirical research has shown that bank balance
sheet channels are an important determinant of firms’ access to credit11 and that banks
differ in their business model with respect to being a relationship lender (e.g., Bolton,
Freixas, Gambacorta, and Mistrulli (2013)).
To rule out estimation bias from bank-side factors, we use the fact the German banking
system consists of different classifications of banks that differ in their financing structure,
their lending behaviour during the financial crisis, and their business model with respect
to being a relationship bank.12 First, commercial banks are universal banks engaged in
both corporate banking and investment banking. They are privately owned and only
to a small extent deposit-financed. Second, savings banks are publicly owned and serve
11See, for example, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Popov and Udell (2012), Jimènez, Ongena,
Peydro, and Saurina (2012), and deYoung, Gron, Torna, and Winton (2014).
12See Hackethal (2004) for a detailed description of the German banking system.
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public interest by taking in deposits and providing credit to borrowers within their region.
Third, Landesbanken, which are also publicly owned, provide services to federal states
and offer large scale funding to companies, which cannot be offered by small savings
banks. The fourth classification contains cooperative banks. Like savings banks, they
only operate within their region and are largely deposit-financed. Cooperative banks are
owned by their members, whose interest they serve.
Table 1.5: Bank classifications, impaired credit finance, and relationship banking
Commercial Savings
bank
Landesbank Cooperative Other
Freq. 401 373 63 214 93
Perc. 61.41% 57.12% 9.65% 32.77% 14.24%
Impaired 21.45% 21.18% 23.81% 17.76% 23.66%
Information 15.71% 13.94% 17.46% 12.15% 16.13%
Reduction 6.98% 6.43% 3.17% 5.61% 5.38%
Availability 10.22% 11.26% 7.94% 8.88% 8.60%
Interest 11.22% 10.19% 15.87% 9.81% 13.98%
Maturities 2.74% 2.41% 4.76% 0.93% 3.23%
Collateral 10.47% 9.92% 4.76% 11.68% 12.90%
Others 3.49% 3.22% 4.76% 2.34% 9.68%
Main bank (1) 37.66% 41.82% 30.16% 45.33% 46.24%
Main bank (2) 38.15% 42.36% 38.10% 41.59% 30.11%
Main bank (0/3+) 24.19% 15.82% 31.75% 13.08% 23.66%
Note: The table shows descriptive statistics for bank-side variables; Commercial, Savings bank, Landes-
bank, Cooperative, and Other equal one if a firm reports that at least one of its two most important
banks belongs to the respective classification of banks.
The data provides the classification of the two most important banks of each firm. We
expect this to be a sufficient control variable for bank-side factors for two reasons. First,
banks’ attitude towards being a relationship lender is unlikely to differ between individual
banks within each classification so that no further bias reduction stems from controlling
for bank-level data. Second, the majority of firms in our sample have one or two main
banks so that it is reasonable to assume that impairments of credit finance are primarily
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determined by the two most important banks. Nevertheless, we use control variables
from bank balance sheets as a robustness check in Section 1.5.3.
Table 1.5 shows that impaired credit finance (Impaired) is most likely for firms that have
a Landesbank and the least likely for firms that have a cooperative bank among the two
most important banks. This was to be expected because Landesbanken were seriously
affected by the financial crisis and therefore most likely to cause impairments of firms’
credit finance. Savings banks and cooperative banks are expected to be the least likely to
do so because they are largely deposit-financed and Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show,
albeit for U.S. data, that deposit-financed banks reduced lending to firms less drastically
in response to the financial crisis than other banks. Furthermore, Table 1.5 provides
clear indications that different kinds of impairments are associated with having different
classifications of banks among the two most important bank relationships.
Table 1.5 also shows that the fraction of firms that do not implement relationship banking
is highest among firms with commercial banks and Landesbanken among the two most
important banks. Relationship banking is more widespread among firms for which savings
banks and cooperative banks are most important. This could be explained differences in
business models between banks. Savings banks and cooperative banks serve customers
only within their region, which makes the establishment of close long-term bank-firm
relationships likely. In addition, firms that rely on Landesbanken and commercial banks
could maintain more bank relationships because they anticipate difficulties in getting
credit from these banks. According to the theoretical model of Detragiache, Garella, and
Guiso (2000), firms with only one bank relationship face the risk of adverse selection if
the relationship bank cannot roll over loans due to liquidity constraints and a firm has
to address banks that have not learned about a firm’s credit quality before. Establishing
multiple bank relationships reduces this risk.
In sum, Table 1.5 shows that bank-side factors affect both a firm’s risk of experiencing
different kinds of impairments of credit finance and its probability of following the concept
of relationship banking. Therefore, controlling for these bank-side factors is crucial to
rule out that they induce bias in the estimated effects of relationship banking on the
probability of impairments of credit finance.
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1.4 Methodology and Results
1.4.1 Methodology
To investigate the channels of relationship banking, we run separate OLS estimations
in which the dependent variables indicate the different kinds of impairments as listed in
Table 1.2 in Section 1.3.2. For example, to test whether relationship banking affects the
probability of facing higher information requirements by banks due to the financial crisis,
we estimate the linear probability model
Informationi = α0 + α1MBi + α2Firmi + α3Banki + α4Industryi + i (1.1)
where MBi is a set of the two dummy variables Main bank (1) and Main bank (2) so
that firms whicht do not use relationship banking by having zero or three and more main
banks constitute the baseline category. Firmi is the set of firm characteristics listed in
Table 1.4 in Section 1.3.4, Banki is the set of dummy variables for having the respective
classification of banks among the two most important banks, and Industryi is a set of
industry dummy variables based on the two-digit WZ 2008 industry classification.
1.4.2 Relationship Banking and Impairments of Credit Finance
Confirming Hypothesis 1, the results in Estimation (1) in Table 1.6 show that the prob-
ability of facing higher information requirements by banks due to the financial crisis is
about 15 percentage points lower for firms that concentrate on one main bank relation-
ship relative to firms that do not follow the concept of relationship banking. The effect
of concentrating business on two main banks is also statistically significant, but substan-
tially smaller. The difference between the two coefficients is not statistically significant.13
This result supports the view that information provision through relationship banking
13Throughout the estimations in this study, the difference between the estimated coefficients of Main
bank (1) and Main bank (2) turn out to be statistically insignificant, which is why test statistics are not
reported for the sake of conciseness.
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limits asymmetric information, which facilitates the bank’s screening process and interim
monitoring. This reduces the necessity to require more information from the firm.
Not supporting Hypothesis 2, Estimations (2) and (3) show that relationship banking
does not affect a firm’s credit availability. The number of main banks does not have a
significant impact on a firm’s probability of experiencing the reduction of existing lines of
credit or constrained availability of new loans or lines of credit. This could be explained
by the banks’ credit granting decisions being primarily based on credit risk models. Since
these models only process hard information and do not account for soft information, it
is reasonable that we do not find a statistically significant effect of relationship banking
on a firm’s credit availability.
Furthermore, Estimation (4) indicates that relationship banking lowers the likelihood
of an increased interest rate for existing loans or lines of credit by almost 10 percentage
points. The effect of having two main banks, however, is even larger, which is not entirely
in line with Hypothesis 3. A potential explanation for this result stems from the fact that
interest rates are subject to a bargaining process between a bank and a firm. Having a
second main bank may improve a firm’s bargaining position and prevent hold-up problems
faced by firms with only one main bank.
Finally, we assess how impairments of non-price terms of credit are affected by relationship
banking (Hypothesis 4). According to Estimation (5), having only one main bank lowers
the probability that banks offer credit only at shorter maturities significantly by almost
5.5 percentage points. When looking at higher collateral requirements in Estimation (6),
the effect is even larger at 7.9 percentage points. There is no such effect for firms with two
main banks, which indicates that relationship banking affects non-price terms of credit
differently than interest rates. In contrast to interest rate payments, these non-price
terms are not a pecuniary transfer and do not immediately affect the profit of the bank.
Instead, they are part of the risk-sharing process between the bank and a firm, which does
not seem to be affected by hold-up problems and their resolution through competition
between banks. One could also argue that soft information from relationship banking
plays a larger role in the risk-sharing process than in bargaining about interest rates.
25
Relationship Banking during the Financial Crisis
Table 1.6: Baseline OLS estimations
(1) (2) (3)
Information Reduction Availability
Main bank (1) -0.1543*** 0.0017 -0.0371
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Main bank (2) -0.1044** 0.0125 -0.0298
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Firm char. Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Bank class. Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.0522 0.0164 0.0441
N 652 652 652
(4) (5) (6)
Interest Maturities Collateral
Main bank (1) -0.0990** -0.0547** -0.0789**
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Main bank (2) -0.1122*** -0.0455** -0.0472
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Firm char. Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Bank class. Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.1059 0.0183 0.0275
N 652 652 652
Note: The table shows OLS estimation results for regressions of dummy variables for different kinds of
impairments of credit finance due to the financial crisis on the number of main bank relationships, a set
of control variables for firm characteristics, bank classification dummy variables, and industry dummy
variables; the baseline category for the main bank relationship dummy variables is Main bank (0/3+);
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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In sum, firms that implement relationship banking have a lower probability of facing im-
pairments of information requirements and non-price terms of credit due to the financial
crisis. Credit availability, however, is not affected by relationship banking. For interest
rates, we find a positive effect of concentrating business on one main bank, but evidence
suggests that having a second main bank is even more advantageous.
1.4.3 Other Determinants of Impairments of Credit Finance
Table A.3 in the Appendix shows the coefficients of all control variables. As expected,
the probabilities of all kinds of impairments of credit finance are lower for firms in a
better financial situation. Furthermore, export activity and incorporation increase the
probability of facing higher interest rates.
In addition, Table A.3 provides the estimated effects of having different classifications
of banks among the two most important banks. Most of the effects are statistically
insignificant, so that the results provide only weak evidence of bank-side effects on the
firms’ risk of facing different kinds of impairments of credit finance.
1.5 Robustness Checks
1.5.1 Estimation of Nonlinear Models
Instead of estimating a linear probability model, the effects of relationship banking could
be estimated using nonlinear estimation procedures based on the following model:
Pr(Informationi = 1) = Φ(α0 + α1MBi + α2Firmi + α3Banki + α4Industryi) (1.2)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution. Ta-
ble A.4 in the Appendix shows that the binary probit marginal effects differ somewhat in
size from the OLS estimators in Table 1.6. However, they confirm our findings that rela-
tionship banking works through information requirements and non-price terms of credit,
but does not affect credit availability. The results for interest rates remain ambiguous.
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Binary probit estimations, however, induce the problem that many observations are
dropped because some control variables (mainly the industry dummy variables) perfectly
predict the value of the outcome variable. Table A.4 in the Appendix shows that this
is particularly problematic in Estimation (4) when using Maturities as the dependent
variable. Therefore, linear probability models are preferable as baseline estimations.
1.5.2 Addressing Potential Reverse Causality
Challenging our interpretation of the results in Section 1.4, one could argue that firms
have reacted to impaired credit finance by setting up further main bank relationships,
which would raise endogeneity concerns. From this perspective, our estimations would
suggest that firms with a high probability of impaired credit finance maintain more main
bank relationships, instead of vice versa.
First, an argument against reverse causality can be derived from the characteristics of
main bank relationships. As Table A.2 in the Appendix shows, a long duration of the bank
relationship is a key criterion for a firm to refer to the respective bank as a main bank.
Even if firms had added business relationships to banks when experiencing impaired credit
finance, these would not constitute long-term relationships. Therefore, it is unlikely that
this increased the number of main banks reported in the survey.
Second, we test for the impact of reverse causality by re-running all estimations after
excluding firms with potential dynamics in their main bank relationships. The survey
data contains the durations of the two most important bank relationships of every firm.
We therefore know whether these were established during the financial crisis, or before.
This allows us to identify firms with dynamics in the structure of their bank relationships,
which may have been caused by the financial crisis and its impact on a firm’s credit
finance. In total, 153 firms are dropped from the sample because their first or second
most important bank relationship was established in 2007 or later.14
14The reduction in the number of observations used in the estimations is smaller as some of the
dropped firms were not considered in the first place because of missing values.
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If reverse causality would drive our results, dropping these firms should affect the esti-
mated effects of relationship banking. The comparison of the results in Table A.5 in the
Appendix to Table 1.6 shows that this is not the case. For the firms left in the sample,
we find that relationship banking affects credit finance by lowering the probability of
higher information requirements and impaired non-price terms of credit due to the finan-
cial crisis. We do not find any effects of relationship banking on credit availability. The
ambiguous results for interest rates do not change either. Therefore, estimations without
firms with young important bank relationships allows us to rule out that our findings are
driven by reverse causality.
1.5.3 Controlling for Bank Balance Sheet Data
Another problem of the estimations in Section 1.4 could stem from the fact that the bank
classification dummy variables do not rule out estimation bias from bank-side factors
entirely. If banks within the different classifications differ with respect to their lending
during the financial crisis (as shown for German savings banks by Puri, Rocholl, and
Steffen (2011a)) and in their attitude towards being a relationship bank, our results
could be driven by remaining heterogeneity in bank characteristics.
To test the robustness of our results with respect to bank heterogeneity within bank
classifications, we re-run our estimations using bank balance sheet variables as control
variables instead of bank classification dummy variables. Unfortunately, data from the Ifo
“Financing of the German Economy” survey does not allow the identification of the banks
to which firms maintain business relationships. Therefore, we draw this information from
the BvD Amadeus database. We then link the balance sheet of each of these banks to
the firm-level data set.
We control for banks’ total assets, their equity ratio, their liquidity ratio, and their
deposit-financing ratio. Each ratio is calculated relative to total assets. We measure
banks’ financial situation during the entire financial crisis by calculating the average of
these balance sheet items over each bank’s balance sheets from the years 2007-2009.
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Table 1.7: Bank balance sheets and relationship banking
Main bank (1) Main bank (2) Main bank (0/3+)
N 649 649 649
Freq. 266 251 132
Perc. 40.99% 38.67% 20.34%
log(Bank assets)max 11.8 12.4 13.5
log(Bank assets)min 8.2 8.1 8.7
Bank equitymax 6.03 6.06 5.83
Bank equitymin 3.28 2.98 2.34
Bank liquiditymax 27.44% 28.32% 31.91%
Bank liquiditymin 16.99% 14.67% 13.50%
Bank depositsmax 65.53% 67.31% 63.29%
Bank depositsmin 41.58% 38.29% 28.25%
Note: The table shows descriptive statistics for bank balance sheet variables; for each variable, the
maximum and minimum value across all banks to which a firm maintains a business relationship according
to the BvD Amadeus database are presented.
As different firms work with different numbers of banks, we have to control for the
financial situation of the whole portfolio of banks. We do so by using the maximum
and minimum values for every variable across the balance sheets of each firm’s banks.15
Table 1.7 provides descriptive statistics for the bank balance sheet variables depending
on a firm’s number of main bank relationships. We find that firms that follow the concept
of relationship banking work with somewhat smaller banks. Their banks also have higher
equity ratios and rely more on deposit financing. The picture for banks’ liquidity is mixed
as minimum and maximum liquidity across a firm’s banks show opposing correlations with
relationship banking.
When controlling for bank balance sheet variables instead of using bank classification
dummy variables, estimation results in Table A.6 in the Appendix confirm most of our
previous findings. Concentrating on one main bank relationship still reduces the risk of
higher information requirements significantly. The effect of having two main banks is
also statistically significant, but substantially smaller. There is, as before, no effect of
relationship banking on credit availability and the results with respect to interest rates
15Without reporting the results in this chapter, we also run estimations using only maximum values,
only minimum values, or mean values across the balance sheets of each firm’s banks as control variables.
The results for the effects of relationship banking on the different kinds of impairments of credit finance
due to the financial crisis are not altered by using different approaches.
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remain ambiguous. There is still a significantly lower risk of the impairment of maturities
when following relationship banking. However, the risk of higher collateral requirements
is no longer significantly affected by relationship banking. Table A.6 in the Appendix
also provides the estimated coefficients of the different bank balance sheet variables.
However, it is hard to interpret these because using minimum and maximum values leads
to problems with multicollinearity between these variables. This, however, does not bias
the estimated effects of relationship banking.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter addresses the question through which channels relationship banking affects
firms’ credit finance during times of financial crisis. We test whether applying relationship
banking by focusing business on one main bank relationship lowered a firm’s risk of facing
different kinds of impairments of credit finance due to the financial crisis of 2007-09. Our
results show that relationship banking lowers the probability that a firm reports higher
information requirements by banks due to the financial crisis. However, relationship
banking does not significantly affect the impairment of firms’ credit availability. For
the interest rate, our results are ambiguous. Here, it seems that a firm benefits from
maintaining only one main bank relationship, but having a second main bank is even
more advantageous. For non-price terms (i.e. maturity and collateral), relationship
banking lowers the probability of impairments significantly.
The effect of relationship banking on information requirements is the most direct evidence
that banks gather information about firms from a bank-firm relationship. The divergent
results for credit availability and the other channels of relationship banking might be
due to the fact that banks use hard rather than soft information in their credit risk
models on which they base their credit granting decision. If credit is granted, however,
soft information from relationship banking affects the negotiation of the credit contract.
This holds even more for non-price terms and conditions that determine the risk-sharing
between banks and firms than for the pecuniary transfer constituted by interest payments.
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These findings underline that relationship banking was beneficial for firms (and thereby
for the whole economy) during the financial crisis, although it was perceived as some-
what superseded before the crisis. Therefore, in times of uncertainty, regulators should
facilitate the flow and use of information from bank-firm relationships. Many magazines
and guidebooks for practitioners also picked up on this topic. For example, a report
by Deloitte & Touche GmbH (2012) concludes that: “the quality of the relationship of
medium-sized firms and their banks is often underrated and thereby neglected. In partic-
ular during a crisis, a long-term and positive relationship is of utmost importance.” Our
analysis provides strong support for this view.
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Chapter 2
Friendship and Money, Oil and
Water? Credit Constraints and
“Family and Friends” Finance
2.1 Introduction
Facing credit constraints induces firms to seek other sources of funding. Recent empirical
evidence shows that many firms used more public market finance1 and trade credit2
in response to the financial crisis of 2007-09. Alternatively, firms may seek capital from
informal sources like “Family and Friends” (F&F) in response to bank credit constraints.3
When going informal, welfare gains from financial intermediation through banks no longer
materialise. Djankov, Lieberman, Mukherjee, and Nenova (2003) argue that firms may
then face higher borrowing costs and that “finance from friends and family is unreliable,
untimely and can bear significant non-financial costs”.
1See, for example, Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2012), Barraza, Lee, and Yeager (2014), and Becker and
Ivashina (2014)
2See, for example, Carbó-Valverde, Rodríguez-Fernández, and Udell (2013) and Coulibaly, Sapriza,
and Zlate (2013)
3Other informal sources such as moneylenders are widespread in developing countries, but are not
common in developed economies.
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Empirical evidence of the use of informal finance has been primarily provided in the con-
text of the capital structure of start-up businesses in developed economies and financial
systems in developing countries.4 However, not much attention has been paid to the
question whether informal finance is also used by established firms in highly developed
countries. Furthermore, previous studies analyse correlations, but do not estimate the
causal effect of bank credit constraints on the use of informal finance.
This chapter analyses the use of F&F finance by non-start-up firms in a highly devel-
oped economy and tests whether it is driven by unsuccessful bank credit negotiations.
The analysis is based on data from the Ifo “Financing of the German Economy” survey,
which was conducted among German manufacturing firms in September 2011. The data
distinguishes between F&F finance from sources connected to the business (“F&F Busi-
ness”) and sources privately connected to the entrepreneur (“F&F Private”). Descriptive
statistics show that 15.46 percent of the firms in the sample use at least one of the two
kinds of F&F finance, which is surprisingly high. The data also contains detailed infor-
mation on each firm’s last bank credit negotiations between 2008 and 2011. The causal
effect of unsuccessful bank credit negotiations on the use of F&F finance is estimated
using instrumental variables (IV) estimations to deal with endogeneity from a potential
signalling effect of F&F finance on a firm’s likelihood of receiving bank credit.
IV estimations show that firms use both kinds of F&F finance in response to unsuc-
cessful negotiations of bank loans. This effect, however, is not found for unsuccessful
negotiations of lines of credit. Therefore, F&F finance seems to be especially relevant
in financing particular investments (substituting loans), but not as much in financing
working capital (substituting lines of credit). The comparison of OLS and IV estimators
indicates that “F&F Business” serves as a positive signal of a firm’s creditworthiness in
bank credit negotiations. This is in line with Berger and Udell (1998), who argue that
4Allen and Qian (2010), Allen, Qian, and Zang (2011), and Allen, Carletti, Qian, and Valenzuela
(2013) provide theories on the finance-and-growth-nexus arguing that informal finance may have advan-
tages over formal finance in supporting economic growth in developing countries. This is supported by
the analysis of data from India (Allen, Chakrabarti, De, Qian, and Qian, 2012) and China (Allen, Qian,
and Qian, 2005). Also using Chinese data, Ayyagari, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2010), however,
do not find a relationship between the use of informal finance and economic growth. Degryse, Lu, and
Ongena (2013) find a positive complementary effect of formal and informal finance on sales growth for
small firms in China, but not for large firms.
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different financial instruments are interconnected and initial insider finance often serves
as a “predicament” for receiving external finance. For “F&F Private”, however, evidence
of its signalling effect is ambiguous.
This study is most closely related to a strand of research on the use of F&F finance
and other kinds of informal finance. The theoretical model by Myers and Majluf (1984)
predicts that firms’ financing decisions follow a pecking order. Because of asymmetric
information, firms preferably rely on internal funding (i.e. retained earnings). If they
need external finance, they prefer debt over equity instruments. However, Myers and
Majluf (1984) do not explicitly state the role of F&F finance in the pecking order. Filling
this gap, Berger and Udell (1998) find that “insider finance” in the form of debt or
equity from the start-up team, family, and friends plays a role in the early stages of
development, but is phased out as the firm matures. This has been supported by several
empirical studies on the determinants of the use of different kinds of informal finance in
start-up businesses and small firms.5 Altogether, these studies find that younger, smaller,
less transparent, and less financially sound firms are more likely to use informal finance.
However, such studies do not explicitly observe the presence of credit constraints.
In this regard, more direct evidence of the correlation between credit constraints and the
use of informal finance is provided by Allen, Chakrabarti, De, Qian, and Qian (2012), who
show that Indian firms use informal finance in response to “limited access to institutional
finance”. Using data on a broad set of firms from 48 countries in the World Business
Environment Survey (WBES), Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2008) further
find that there is a correlation between financing obstacles and the use of finance from
informal lenders.6 Such correlations, however, do not allow a causal interpretation.
The following empirical analysis amends this literature by using an IV approach to esti-
mate the causal effect of unsuccessful bank credit negotiations on the use of F&F finance.
The comparison of OLS and IV estimators provides evidence of whether F&F finance is
5For analyses of start-up businesses, see, for example, Chavis, Klapper, and Love (2011), Sanyal and
Mann (2010), Astebro and Bernhardt (2003), Basu and Parker (2001), Romano, Tanewski, and Smyrnios
(2001), and Fluck, Holtz-Eakin, and Rosen (1998). For analyses of small firms, see, for example, Denis
and Mihov (2003), Berger and Udell (2002), and Bitler, Robb, and Wolken (2001).
6Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2008) define informal finance as financing coming from
“informal moneylenders and other traditional sources”. They categorise F&F finance as internal finance
and do not provide further evidence of its use.
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a positive or a negative signal of a firm’s creditworthiness in credit negotiations with
banks. A particular contribution stems from the use of data on firms of all size and age
groups in a highly developed economy without a focus on start-up businesses.
Since the use of F&F finance requires both demand and supply of this kind of funding, the
following analysis can also be seen as a test of the theoretical predictions by Giannetti and
Yu (2014). They develop a model to investigate lending and borrowing between connected
sources, such as F&F finance. Their model predicts that “financiers allocate capital on
the basis of prior connections, instead of collecting information on the [...] entrepreneur”,
depending on the initial capital, transparency, and the quality of investment opportunities
in an economy. They show that, even in advanced economies (i.e. those economies with a
high level of initial capital), high costs of information acquisition and low average quality
of potential borrowers can prompt financiers to “forfeit information acquisition” and lend
to “connected entrepreneurs” only.
This prediction is applicable to Germany during the financial crisis of 2007-09, which
is captured by the sample used in this analysis. When the German economy was hit
by the slowdown of global economic activity, many firms faced a sharp drop in demand
for their products and uncertainty about firms’ creditworthiness increased (International
Monetary Fund, 2009). In the context of the model by Giannetti and Yu (2014) this can be
interpreted as a deterioration of borrower quality and increasing information acquisition
costs. The model predicts that depositors in Germany preferred to lend to “connected
entrepreneurs” rather than acquiring information on potential borrowers. This is in line
with data in this study providing evidence of a widespread supply of F&F finance in the
German economy.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, two hypotheses
are derived from existing literature. Section 2.3 provides a description of the data set
as well as descriptive statistics on the use of F&F finance and unsuccessful bank credit
negotiations. Section 2.4 provides estimation results for OLS and IV approaches. Section
2.6 addresses sample selection issues and the role of discouraged borrowers. Finally,
Section 2.7 summarises the findings.
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2.2 Hypotheses
Existing empirical literature shows that firms’ use of informal finance is correlated with
credit constraints (e.g., Allen, Chakrabarti, De, Qian, and Qian (2012), Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Maksimovic (2008)). This is in line with the pecking order theory predicting
that firms first borrow from closely connected sources before moving towards arm’s length
finance. It also raises the question whether credit constraints actually drive firms into
F&F finance or if the correlation can be explained by the signalling effect of F&F finance
on a firm’s probability of receiving bank credit. In particular, it is worth testing the
significance of such a causal effect for established firms in a highly developed economy.
Hypothesis 1: Unsuccessful bank credit negotiations cause firms to use of F&F finance,
even established firms in a highly developed country.
Resolving endogeneity issues raises the follow-up question whether the use of informal
finance facilitates access to credit or if it makes it more difficult. A strand of literature
provides evidence of the signalling effect of trade credit on access to bank credit because
of trade partners’ ability to assess a firm’s creditworthiness (e.g., Giannetti, Burkart,
and Ellingsen (2011), Engemann, Eck, and Schnitzer (2011)). In a similar manner, such
a signalling effect could exist for F&F finance due to the information that connected
firms and individuals gather about a firm. Banks could take the fact that firms receive
funding from closely related sources as a positive signal of creditworthiness. This may be
particularly important when asymmetric information is high, for example, because firms
are very young, face high entrepreneurial risk, or do not have a track record of repaid
debt.
Hypothesis 2: Using F&F finance is a positive signal of a firm’s creditworthiness.
Alternatively, a firm’s use of F&F finance could prompt a bank to abstain from granting
credit for two reasons. First, the use of F&F finance could be a result of previous
unsuccessful credit negotiations, possibly with other financial institutions. Second, from
a bank’s point of view, the use of F&F finance might carry a whiff of opaqueness, which
could threaten the success of bank credit negotiations.
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2.3 Data
2.3.1 The Data Set
The following analysis is based on data concerning firms’ use of F&F finance, their recent
bank credit negotiations, and numerous firm characteristics from the Ifo “Financing of
the German Economy” survey, which is described in Chapter 1. The age structure of the
firms in the sample is skewed towards older firms (see descriptive statistics in Section
2.3.4), which makes the data set particularly suited to analyse the use of F&F finance in
a broad set of firms without a focus on start-up businesses.
Because the survey data contains only a small amount of information on firms’ financial
situations, it is complemented with 2011 firm balance sheet data from the Bureau van
Dyk (BvD) Amadeus database and 2011 credit ratings from Creditreform, a German
rating agency. A description of all variables is provided in Table 2.1.
2.3.2 The Use of F&F Finance in Germany
In the following, firms are divided into those that use F&F finance (F&F firms) and those
that do not (non-F&F firms). Considering that Germany is a highly developed economy
and that the sample does not focus on start-up businesses, the fraction of F&F firms in
the sample is surprisingly high at 15.46 percent. In comparison, capital market finance
is used by 3.6 percent and factoring by 10 percent of the firms.
The data distinguishes two kinds of F&F finance. “F&F Business” is defined as a firm
receiving capital from a firm or person close to the business (e.g., customers, suppliers).
“F&F Private” indicates that capital is received from a person privately connected to the
entrepreneur. “F&F Business” is used by 5.79 percent of the firms in the sample. “F&F
Private” is about twice as important with 11.81 percent of the firms using it. Analysing
both kinds of F&F finance separately provides additional insights as they potentially
differ in their degree of informality. While “F&F Business” can be expected to be widely
based on formal contracts, informal procedures are more likely for “F&F Private”.
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Table 2.1: Variable descriptions
Variable Description
“Family and Friends” finance
F&F Firm receives capital from “Family and Friends”
F&F Business Firm receives capital from F&F close to the business (e.g.,
customers, suppliers)
F&F Private Firm receives capital from F&F privately connected to the
entrepreneur
Bank Credit Negotiations
Rejected (line) Last negotiated line of credit (since 2008) was rejected or
only partially granted
Rejected (loan) Last negotiated loan (since 2008) was rejected or only par-
tially granted
Discretion Loan officer had a larger impact on the credit granting de-
cision than the bank-internal credit rating
Firm size and age
Empl Number of employees
Assets Total assets
Age Firm age in years, based on year of foundation
Transparency
Incorporated Firm is a corporation by its legal status
Ext. rating Firm has external rating besides banks’ internal ones
Customer Share of business that is conducted with the three most
important customers
Export Firm is exporting
Ownership
Group Firm is part of a group company
Family Largest shareholder is a single person or family
Control Percentage share held by largest shareholder
Operating Largest shareholder active in operative management
Financial condition
Rating Score between 100 (sound) to 600 (risky)
Equity Equity/Assets
Long-term debt Long-term debt/Assets
Cash Cash/Assets
Return EBIT/Turnover
Earlypay Cash discounts drawn/Cash discounts offered to firm
Sources: Ifo “Financing of the German Economy” survey, BvD Amadeus database, and Creditreform.
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2.3.3 F&F Finance and Unsuccessful Bank Credit Negotiations
Data on the use of F&F finance can be linked to a firm’s most recent bank credit nego-
tiations. In total, 496 firms negotiated a line of credit between 2008 and 2011 and 510
firms negotiated a bank loan.7 For this analysis, negotiations are defined as unsuccessful
if credit is not granted or granted only at a smaller volume than demanded by the firm.
It is important to note that this encompasses rejections of a credit application by the
bank, as well as situations in which a firm decides to withdraw the application because of
unfavourable terms of credit offered by the bank (e.g., when interest rates are too high).
Either scenario can be interpreted as a situation in which a firm faces credit constraints.
Table 2.2: F&F finance and credit negotiations
Rejected (line) Rejected (loan)
Yes No p > t Yes No p > t
N 71 425 64 446
Perc. 14.31% 85.69% 12.55% 87.45%
F&F 30.00% 18.75% 0.03** 35.48% 15.67% 0.000***
F&F Business 23.53% 14.56% 0.06* 30.65% 13.02% 0.000***
F&F Private 13.64% 6.47% 0.04** 13.56% 4.71% 0.006***
Notes: The table shows the fraction of F&F firms separately among firms that have successfully ne-
gotiated bank credit and among those that have negotiated unsuccessfully; p-values are reported for
two-group mean comparison t-tests on whether the two groups of firms differ significantly with respect
to the probability of using F&F finance; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 2.2 shows that F&F finance is significantly more widespread among firms that have
experienced unsuccessful bank credit negotiations. This holds for both “F&F Business”
and “F&F Private”. The difference is more pronounced for unsuccessful negotiations of
bank loans than for those of lines of credit, which suggests that F&F finance is more
important in financing particular investments than for working capital financing. Table
B.1 in the Appendix shows that 72.3 percent of the negotiated lines of credit in the sam-
ple were used for working capital finance, but only 57.1 percent served the financing of
investments. In contrast, loans were primarily used for investments with enhancements
7As firms reported negotiations of lines of credit and loans separately in the survey, each firm could
report up to two bank credit negotiations between 2008 and 2011.
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being the most frequent purpose. Only 15.1 percent of the loans were used for “other”
purposes, which includes working capital finance. The analysis of firms’ text-based spec-
ification of “other” purposes of loans show that only 1.5 percent of the loans were used
for working capital finance. Debt restructuring and liquidity protection were the most
prominent “other” purposes of loans.
2.3.4 F&F Finance and Firm Characteristics
A key challenge in the following estimations is to hold constant the firm characteristics
which drive both the outcome of a firm’s credit negotiations and its use of F&F finance.
The data provides a broad set of control variables for a firm’s creditworthiness, character-
istics that are found in the empirical literature to determine a firm’s capital structure in
general, and predictors of the use of bank debt and informal finance in particular. Table
2.3 shows how F&F firms differ from non-F&F firms in these variables.8 Altogether, they
are significantly smaller and in a worse financial condition. They also differ in ownership
variables. Evidence of differences in firm age and transparency, however, is less clear.
Firm size and age
Firm size and age are widely accepted as determinants of a firm’s capital structure. For
example, small firms rarely use public market finance because they are less capable of
dealing with high transaction costs (Titman and Wessels, 1988). In line with existing
empirical literature on firm size and informal finance9, Table 2.3 shows that F&F firms
are smaller in terms of the number of employees and total assets.
Firm age is another determinant of a firm’s capital structure as older firms are more likely
to have a track record of successful business activity and repaid debt. According to Table
2.3, F&F firms are younger than non-F&F firms, which confirms previous studies.10
8Table B.2 in the Appendix further provides descriptive statistics separately for firms that use “F&F
Business” and for those that use “F&F Private”.
9See, for example, Allen, Chakrabarti, De, Qian, and Qian (2012), Chavis, Klapper, and Love (2011),
Sanyal and Mann (2010), Denis and Mihov (2003), Berger and Udell (2002), Bitler, Robb, and Wolken
(2001), Romano, Tanewski, and Smyrnios (2001), and Berger and Udell (1998).
10See, for example, Allen, Chakrabarti, De, Qian, and Qian (2012), Chavis, Klapper, and Love
(2011), Berger and Udell (2002), Romano, Tanewski, and Smyrnios (2001), Fluck, Holtz-Eakin, and
Rosen (1998), and Berger and Udell (1998).
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Table 2.3: F&F finance and firm characteristics
F&F=1 F&F=0
(N=169) (N=924)
X¯FF X
med
FF σFF X¯noFF X
med
noFF σnoFF p > t
log(Empl) 4.61 4.46 1.75 5.02 4.83 1.85 0.008***
log(Assets) 8.80 8.69 2.18 9.23 9.08 2.27 0.04**
log(Age) 3.95 4.17 1.04 4.05 4.36 0.96 0.22
Incorporated 63.69% 1 48.23% 62.01% 1 48.56% 0.68
Ext. rating 25.00% 0 43.43% 21.25% 0 40.93% 0.28
Customer (< 10%) 18.67% 0 39.09% 20.04% 0 40.06% 0.68
Customer (10% to <30%) 40.36% 0 49.21% 45.26% 0 49.80% 0.24
Customer (30% to <50%) 25.30% 0 43.61% 19.16% 0 39.38% 0.07*
Customer (50% +) 15.66% 0 36.45% 15.53% 0 36.24% 0.97
Export 82.63% 1 37.99% 88.46% 1 31.97% 0.04**
Group 26.63% 0 44.33% 39.65% 0 48.94% 0.001***
Family 82.25% 1 38.32% 74.59% 1 43.56% 0.03**
Control 70.36% 75% 26.46% 73.83% 88% 28.95% 0.15
Operating owner 68.64% 1 46.53% 59.50% 1 49.12% 0.03**
Rating 216.79 208 90.38 197.49 186 90.46 0.01**
Equity 22.78% 27.47% 47.84% 37.55% 38.08% 32.45% 0.000***
Debt 33.92% 22.73% 48.83% 22.82% 13.95% 29.15% 0.000***
Cash 9.21% 3.99% 12.81% 11.37% 5.32% 14.37% 0.11
Return (<3%) 58.33% 1 49.46% 43.13% 0 49.55% 0.000***
Return (3 to <7%) 28.21% 0 45.14% 33.18% 0 47.11% 0.22
Return (7 to <10%) 7.69% 0 26.73% 14.69% 0 35.42% 0.02**
Return (10% +) 5.77% 0 23.39% 9.00% 0 28.64% 0.18
Earlypay (0%) 4.29% 0 20.34% 3.01% 0 17.11% 0.39
Earlypay (<25%) 19.63% 0 39.84% 13.73% 0 34.43% 0.05*
Earlypay (25 to <50%) 6.75% 0 25.16% 9.38% 0 29.16% 0.28
Earlypay (50 to <75%) 16.56% 0 37.29% 9.38% 0 29.16% 0.006***
Earlypay (75% +) 52.76% 1 50.08% 64.51% 1 47.88% 0.004***
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for firm characteristics separately for F&F firms and non-
F&F firms; p-values are reported for t-tests with H0: X¯FF = X¯noFF ; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Transparency
Furthermore, transparency affects a firm’s capital structure and the use of (informal)
funding from personal sources (Berger and Udell, 1998). First, incorporation measures
transparency because it determines a firm’s publication obligations, which affect access to
bank debt and public debt (Cassar, 2004; Ang, 1992) as well as informal finance (Chavis,
Klapper, and Love, 2011; Sanyal and Mann, 2010; Bitler, Robb, and Wolken, 2001).
Second, having an external rating indicates transparency and affects a firm’s capital
structure (Croci, Doukas, and Gonenc, 2011; Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Denis and
Mihov, 2003). Additionally, customer concentration is used as a proxy for transparency as
firms with widespread customers have a higher interest in transparency. Finally, export
business can increase uncertainty and thereby requires a firm to be transparent. The
data in Table 2.3 shows that F&F firms do not differ significantly from non-F&F firms
in these variables, except that they are significantly less likely to export.
Ownership
Empirical literature provides evidence that a firm’s ownership status also affects its capital
structure. First, belonging to a group company reduces the need to use external finance
as more internal funds are available (Masulis, Pham, and Zein, 2011). Second, family
businesses and non-family businesses differ in their capital structures.11 Furthermore,
capital structure decisions can be affected by the owner’s control rights (Croci, Doukas,
and Gonenc, 2011; Stulz, 1988) and by whether the largest shareholder of the firm is a
member of the operating board (Chavis, Klapper, and Love, 2011).
As Table 2.3 shows, F&F firms are significantly less likely to belong to a group company.
They are more likely to be family-owned and the largest shareholder is more likely to
be part of a firm’s operating board. The share of the largest shareholder is somewhat
smaller among F&F firms, but the difference is not statistically significant.
11See, for example, Chua, Chrisman, Kellermanns, and Wu (2011), Croci, Doukas, and Gonenc (2011),
Ellul (2010), Romano, Tanewski, and Smyrnios (2001), and Coleman and Carsky (1999).
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Financial condition
Finally, a set of variables measured in 2011 is used to assess the impact of a firm’s financial
situation on its capital structure (Denis and Mihov, 2003; Lemmon and Zender, 2010).
According to Table 2.3, F&F firms are more risky in terms of the Creditreform rating,
have a lower equity ratio, more long-term debt, and less cash. Variables for a firm’s
return on sales and the fraction of early payment discounts that the firm was able to
draw underline that F&F firms are in a worse financial condition than non-F&F firms.
2.4 Methodology and Results
2.4.1 Methodology
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations
In a first step, OLS estimations are applied to rule out that the correlation of unsuccessful
bank credit negotiations and F&F finance is driven by firm heterogeneity. Although the
dependent variables in the following estimations are binary, a linear probability model
(LPM) is applied instead of a non-linear estimation to make the results comparable to
the linear IV estimations below. Estimations are therefore based on the following linear
model:
F&Fi = 1 = β0 + β1Rejectedi + β2Xi + i (2.1)
whereXi contains control variables for firm characteristics listed in Table 2.3 and industry
dummy variables based on the two-digit WZ 2008 industry classification. The latter rule
out potential industry effects on the firms’ capital structure and the use of F&F finance
(Bitler, Robb, and Wolken, 2001; Romano, Tanewski, and Smyrnios, 2001). Rejectedi
stands either for Rejected (line) or Rejected (loan).
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The instrumental variable: Discretionary lending
OLS estimators of the effect of unsuccessful bank credit negotiations on the use of F&F
finance do not allow a causal interpretation. As discussed in Section 2.2, receiving capital
from a connected source could serve as a positive (or negative) signal of a firm’s credit-
worthiness and increase (or decrease) its chances of receiving bank credit. In both cases,
OLS estimations would be affected by endogeneity.
Identification of a causal effect can be achieved by applying an IV approach, which re-
quires an instrumental variable that satisfies three conditions. First, it must be a relevant
predictor of the outcome of bank credit negotiations. Second, it must not affect a firm’s
decision to use F&F finance, except through the outcome of bank credit negotiations.
Finally, the instrumental variable has to be independent of the use of F&F finance con-
ditional on the control variables.
In the following, a variable indicating that a bank applies discretionary lending in the
decision about granting credit provides an instrumental variable that satisfies all three
conditions. In practice, banks can decide about credit applications based on a rules-based
and pre-codified lending process or leave the credit granting decision to the discretion of
the loan officer. In the Ifo “Financing of the German Economy” survey, firms that have
negotiated bank credit report whether the loan officer had a larger impact on the credit
granting decision than a firm’s credit rating. The variable Discretioni equals one if this
was the case and therefore indicates that the bank applied discretionary lending.
There are two arguments why discretionary lending is a relevant predictor of bank credit
negotiation outcomes in line with the first condition of an instrumental variable. First,
in rules-based lending, banks decide whether to lend based on credit scores that are
derived only from hard information about the firm (e.g., balance sheet information). If
discretionary lending is applied, soft information is also considered in the credit granting
decision. Therefore, a broader range of information is collected and taken into account,
which lowers uncertainty for the bank and improves its ability to price the credit contract.
This increases the probability that the bank grants credit given a firm’s creditworthiness.
Second, discretionary lending provides more room for credit decisions to be based on
the flow of information from the personal relationship between the loan officer and the
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customer. This increases the probability of a firm receiving credit, in particular in times of
constrained credit supply (e.g., Sharpe (1990); von Thadden (2004)). How discretionary
lending predicts a bank’s credit granting decisions is further discussed by Puri, Rocholl,
and Steffen (2011b). Their empirical analysis based on a large data set of loans to
retail customers shows that discretion in the loan approval decision increases the number
of customers that receive credit, which further supports the relevance of discretionary
lending as an instrumental variable in the following estimations.
The second condition is also satisfied by discretionary lending as the decision process is
deeply rooted in the organisational structure and operational culture of the bank. There-
fore, the presence of discretionary lending in a bank affects a firm’s financing decisions
(e.g., about F&F finance) only through the result of bank credit negotiations.
Whether discretionary lending is independent of F&F finance conditional on the control
variables remains the key assumption in the following IV estimations. Gropp, Gruendl,
and Guettler (2013) show that certain firms select themselves into borrowing from dis-
cretionary lenders, for example, depending on their creditworthiness. Such selection
behaviour can be ruled out as affecting the IV estimations in this study because firms’
credit risk and their financial situation is controlled for by a large set of control variables.
Proving the validity of the instrumental variable beyond factors held constant by con-
trol variables, the discussion in Section 2.5 provides further evidence of F&F firms not
selecting themselves into negotiations with banks that are likely to apply discretionary
lending.
IV estimations: Avoiding the “forbidden” regression
Endogeneity enters the basic model in Equation 2.1 through Rejectedi, which is a binary
variable. This raises concerns about the “forbidden regression” in which predicted values
from a non-linear first-stage estimation are used in an IV approach. Angrist and Pischke
(2008), and Wooldridge (2010) suggest the following estimation approach to make use of
potential non-linearity in the conditional expectations function.
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The first step contains a binary probit estimation of the model
Pr(Rejectedi = 1) = Φ(α0 + α1Xi + α2Discretioni) (2.2)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution.
Xi contains all control variables and industry dummy variables, and Discretioni is the
instrumental variable. Two separate estimations are run for Rejected (line) and Rejected
(loan).12 Predicted values for the probability of unsuccessful bank credit negotiations are
calculated from both estimations. Following Angrist and Pischke (2008), and Wooldridge
(2010), these predicted values are used as instrumental variables for Rejected (line) and
Rejected (loan), respectively, in two-stage least squares estimations.
2.4.2 Results: Ordinary Least Squares Estimations
According to OLS estimations in Table 2.4, the use of F&F finance is not significantly
affected by unsuccessful negotiations of a line of credit. The effect of unsuccessful nego-
tiations of a loan, however, is substantially larger and statistically significant. Therefore,
F&F finance is more important to firms that need to finance particular investments than
to those that need working capital finance.
Table 2.4 further suggests that the effect is driven by “F&F Private”, which is a more
important substitute for unsuccessfully negotiated bank credit than “F&F Business”. In
Estimations (3) and (4), unsuccessful bank credit negotiations do not have a significant
effect on “F&F Business”. Furthermore, unsuccessful negotiations of lines of credit do
not affect the probability that a firm uses “F&F Private” in Estimation (5). Estimation
(6), however, confirms that unsuccessful negotiations of a bank loan are associated with
a significantly higher probability of using “F&F Private”.
12The results for the two estimations are presented in Table B.3 in the Appendix. The coefficients of
the variableDiscretioni are large and highly statistically significant in both estimations, which underlines
the relevance of the instrumental variable in predicting the outcome of bank credit negotiations.
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Table 2.4: OLS estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
F&F F&F F&F F&F F&F F&F
Business Business Private Private
Rejected (line) 0.053 0.009 0.072
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Rejected (loan) 0.178* 0.097 0.160*
(0.09) (0.06) (0.08)
Firm char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.1480 0.1116 0.1360 0.1306 0.1497 0.1354
N 289 308 279 303 284 304
Notes: The table shows results for six separate OLS estimations; firm characteristics comprise all control
variables listed in Table 2.3; industry dummy variables are included based on the two-digit WZ 2008
industry classification; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
2.4.3 Results: Instrumental Variables Estimations
Table 2.5 provides results for IV estimations ruling out endogeneity. Estimation (1)
shows that unsuccessful negotiations of a line of credit do not cause firms to use F&F
finance. According to Estimation (2), however, firms use F&F finance as a substitute
for unsuccessfully negotiated bank loans. Estimations (4) and (6) underline that this
substitution effect is driven by both kinds of F&F finance. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is
confirmed for bank loans, but not for lines of credit. This underlines that F&F finance is
used by firms as an alternative source of funding for particular investments, but not for
working capital finance.
The summary statistics of the first-stage regression in Table 2.5 show that the F-statistic
is above ten for all estimations.13 The test criteria suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005)
are satisfied at the ten percent level in all estimations. Therefore, discretionary lending
provides a sufficiently strong instrument for unsuccessful bank credit negotiations. Com-
paring the different estimations, it seems to be a stronger instrument for unsuccessful
negotiations of a line of credit than for unsuccessful negotiations of a loan.
13A critical value of ten is suggested as a rule of thumb by Staiger and Stock (1997).
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Table 2.5: IV estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
F&F F&F F&F F&F F&F F&F
Business Business Private Private
Rejected (line) 0.219 0.137 0.041
(0.21) (0.16) (0.17)
Rejected (loan) 0.634** 0.430** 0.480*
(0.31) (0.21) (0.27)
Firm char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 33.21*** 15.16*** 34.55*** 12.89*** 31.49*** 15.91***
MES 35.81*** 18.08*** 35.94*** 17.14*** 35.34*** 18.49***
N 234 225 225 220 230 222
Note: The table shows results of separate IV estimations; firm characteristics comprise all control vari-
ables listed in Table 2.3; industry dummy variables are included based on the two-digit WZ 2008 industry
classification; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; F is the F-statistic for the first-stage
estimation testing for weak instruments; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; MES provides the min-
imum eigenvalue statistic for the Stock and Yogo (2005) test for weak instruments with *** indicating
significance at the 10 percent level.
2.4.4 Signalling Effect of F&F Finance
The comparison of the estimated effects from IV estimations to those from OLS estima-
tions sheds light on whether F&F finance is taken by banks as a positive or a negative
signal of a firm’s creditworthiness (see Hypothesis 2). If it was a positive signal, its use
would be negatively correlated with the probability of unsuccessful credit negotiations,
which would lead OLS estimators to underestimate the effect of unsuccessful credit nego-
tiations of F&F finance. IV estimations would therefore lead to higher estimated effects
than OLS estimations. If F&F finance was a negative signal, the opposite would be the
case and IV estimations would reduce estimated effects relative to OLS estimations.
Compared to OLS estimation, the impact of unsuccessful bank credit negotiations on
the use of “F&F Business” increases in both IV estimations, which suggests that “F&F
Business” is taken as a positive signal of a firm’s creditworthiness. This result supports
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Hypothesis 2. For “F&F Private”, however, the picture is mixed with estimated effects
decreasing in IV estimations of the effect of unsuccessfully negotiated lines of credit, but
increasing in estimations of the effect of unsuccessfully negotiated loans.
This shows that receiving capital from business-related sources (e.g., suppliers or cus-
tomers) is a stronger positive signal of creditworthiness than receiving capital from pri-
vately connected sources. The latter could even be a negative signal. This is reasonable
as business-related lenders might be more motivated and better able to assess a firm’s
business activity, and therefore its creditworthiness than persons who are only privately
connected to the entrepreneur. In contrast, the latter may have the incentive to provide
capital for altruistic reasons even if creditworthiness is low. Furthermore, the degree of
informality could be higher for “F&F Private”, which could induce banks to abstain from
lending to the firm.
2.5 Discussion of the Instrumental Variable
Using discretionary lending as an instrumental variable for unsuccessful bank credit ne-
gotiations is valid if discretionary lending and the use of F&F finance are independent
conditional on the control variables included in the estimations. In the following, the
data is used to test the satisfaction of this condition by analysing under which circum-
stances discretionary lending is applied by a bank and whether these are more likely to
be prevalent for F&F firms.
First, the data allows to test whether F&F firms select themselves into negotiations with
banks that are particularly likely to apply discretionary lending. Whether banks do so
depends primarily on their business model. As described by Hackethal (2004), the Ger-
man banking system comprises several classifications of banks, which differ substantially
in their business models. Private commercial banks are typically universal banks offering
a wide range of financial products. Savings banks are publicly owned and focus on taking
in deposits and providing credit to the economy within their region. Landesbanken serve
as central banks to savings banks and provide large scale funding that cannot be offered
by small savings banks. Cooperative banks have a business model comparable to the
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one of savings banks, but they are mutually owned by their members, whom they serve.
Finally, the data contains a category of “Other banks” that comprises banks that do not
fall into either of these categories (e.g., foreign banks).
Table 2.6: Determinants of Discretionary Lending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Commercial 0.0022 -0.0559
(0.04) (-0.76)
Savings bank 0.0727 0.0177
(1.15) (0.21)
Landesbank 0.1643* 0.1460
(1.84) (1.43)
Cooperative 0.0684 0.0074
(0.96) (0.08)
log(Length) -0.0204 -0.0300
(-1.06) (-1.42)
log(Distance) -0.0158 -0.0132
(-0.80) (-0.55)
Credit (%) 0.0014*** 0.0010*
(2.62) (1.72)
Meeting 0.0864 0.0811
(1.35) (1.23)
Vol. (0.1 to < 0.25) 0.0955 0.0863
(1.44) (1.18)
Vol. (1 to < 5) 0.0084 0.0256
(0.14) (0.37)
Vol. (5 to < 50) -0.0176 0.0836
(-0.25) (1.04)
Vol. (50+) -0.0472 0.0155
(-0.57) (0.15)
N 1,125 1,099 1,110 1,073 1,114 1,340 982
Notes: The table shows results for OLS estimations in a sample of all credit negotiations of all firms since
2008; the dependent variable in all estimations is the dummy variable indicating that the bank decided
about granting credit based on discretionary lending; the baseline category for the bank classification
dummy variables is “Other banks”; relationship length is measured in years; distance is measured in
travel minutes from the headquarters of the firm to the bank; the variable credit provides the share of
credit a firm has with the bank; the dummy variable meeting indicates that the firm meets with the bank
in person on a monthly basis rather than less frequently; “Vol.” denotes the volume of credit measured
in million EUR with “Vol. (< 100)” being the baseline category; standard errors are clustered at the
firm-level and reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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To figure out whether different classifications of banks are differently inclined to apply
discretionary lending, the firm-level data from the Ifo “Financing of the German Econ-
omy” survey can be transformed into a data set of the last bank credit negotiations of all
firms. Each firm reports the last negotiations of a line of credit and the last negotiations
of a bank loan so that up to two observations per firm are available. For every negotia-
tion, firms could report with which classification of banks these negotiations were held.
This information can be linked to whether the credit granting decision was made based
on discretionary lending.
The application of discretionary lending may also be driven by certain firm-bank relation-
ship characteristics, which are provided in the data. First, the relationship length and
the geographical distance (measured by the travel distance in minutes) could drive dis-
cretionary lending because a long relationship and proximity might lead to close personal
ties. Other factors could be the fraction of credit that the firm proceeds through the bank
and whether a firm’s banker is met in person on a monthly basis or less frequently. In
addition to these firm-bank relationship characteristics, the impact of negotiated credit
volume on the likelihood of discretionary lending can be assessed.
Based on all credit negotiations of all firms, Estimation (1) in Table 2.6 shows that
discretionary lending is significantly more likely for Landesbanken with “Other banks”
being the baseline category. When including all variables in Estimation (7), the effect
turns insignificant. Furthermore, there is no evidence that savings banks and cooperative
banks are particularly likely to apply discretionary lending. For private commercial
banks, the probability is somewhat lower, but the difference is not statistically significant.
Among the firm-bank relationship characteristics, only the fraction of credit proceeded
through the bank seems to drive discretionary lending. The effect of monthly meetings
is insignificant, but very stable between Estimations (5) and (7).
Therefore, if F&F firms selected themselves into negotiations with discretionary lenders,
they should be more likely to negotiate with Landesbanken, banks through which they
proceed a large share of credit, and banks with which they meet on a monthly basis.
Table 2.7 shows regressions of variables indicating the classification of the bank with
which a firm negotiated on whether a firm uses F&F finance. The results show that F&F
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Table 2.7: F&F firms, credit negotiations, and bank classifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Commercial Savings bank Landesbank Cooperative Other bank
F&F -0.056 0.019 0.028 0.071* -0.062***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
N 1,113 1,113 1,113 1,113 1,113
Notes: The table shows results for OLS estimations in a sample of all credit negotiations of all firms
since 2008; standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
firms are not more likely to negotiate with Landesbanken. They tend to select themselves
away from negotiations with “Other Banks” and towards cooperative banks, but these
do not differ in their attitude towards discretionary lending.
Furthermore, Table 2.8 shows that the firm-bank relationships in which F&F firms ne-
gotiate bank credit are not characterised by a particularly high share of credit held with
the bank or a high likelihood of monthly meetings. Therefore, the circumstances un-
der which discretionary lending is applied are not significantly more or less likely to be
in place for F&F firms. Hence, neither bank classifications nor firm-bank relationship
characteristics show any signs of F&F firms selecting themselves into negotiations with
discretionary lenders, which strengthens the view that discretionary lending provides a
valid instrumental variable for unsuccessful bank credit negotiations.
Table 2.8: F&F firms, credit negotiations, and bank-firm relationships
(1) (2)
Credit (%) Meeting
F&F -0.281 -0.004
(3.22) (0.03)
N 1,061 1,097
Notes: The table shows results for OLS estimations in a sample of all credit negotiations of all firms
since 2008; standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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2.6 Robustness Checks
2.6.1 Controlling for Sample Selection Bias
So far, all estimations have been conducted in the sample of firms that have negotiated
a line of credit or a loan, respectively, which raises concerns about sample selection bias.
This is addressed by applying a two-step estimation procedure suggested by Heckman
(1979). From estimations of a probit model for firms’ decisions to enter bank credit
negotiations, the inverse Mills ratio can be calculated for every observation. The ratio is
then included as a control variable in the OLS and IV estimations analogue to Section 2.4.
In a comparable setup, Brown, Ongena, Popov, and Yeşin (2011) apply this procedure
to control for selection effects when analysing the determinants of credit demand and
credit access of firms in Eastern Europe using data from the Business Environment and
Enterprise Survey (BEEPS).
In this empirical analysis, however, the second step of such a selection model contains an
IV estimation. To the best of my knowledge, there is no standard procedure to estimate
the correct standard errors in such a setup. Unfortunately, bootstrapped standard errors
are not available due to the small number of observations in the data set. Therefore, the
following results can only be considered as a “back-of-the-envelope” analysis to control
for sample selection bias. The selection process is modelled as
Pr(Negotiationi) = Φ(β0 + β1Xi + β2Competitioni) (2.3)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of a normal distribution, Xi is the set
of control variables and industry dummy variables, and Competitioni is a set of dummy
variables measuring the level of competition a firm faces.14 The latter serve as exclusion
restrictions in order to ensure identification of the two-step estimator. Hainz and Nabokin
(2013) also use competition as an exclusion restriction when estimating how firms select
themselves into having credit demand. They argue that “firms may invest more often
in order to improve their position relative to other competitors” when facing high levels
14The level of competition on a scale from 1 to 11 is reported by firms in the Ifo “Financing of the
German Economy” survey.
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of competition and that this increases their probability of having credit demand. They
further claim that the exogeneity with respect to the success of bank credit negotiations
is ensured because banks assess the level of competition at the industry-level only. As
industry dummy variables are included in all estimations in this study, any effects of
competition on the outcome of credit negotiations should be ruled out.
The argument of Hainz and Nabokin (2013) is directly applicable to the estimation of
a model for firms’ selection into negotiations of bank loans, which are used to finance
investments. It is also applicable to negotiations of lines of credit because some firms
use them to finance investments. When facing high levels of competition, firms may also
increase their working capital to improve their competitiveness.
From the probit estimations, the inverse Mills ratio is calculated and used as a control
variable in the OLS estimations as described in Section 2.4.1. The results in Table B.4 in
the Appendix confirm previous OLS estimation results from Section 2.4.2: Unsuccessful
negotiations of a bank loan are associated with a higher probability of using F&F finance.
This is primarily driven by the significant effect of unsuccessful loan negotiations on the
use of “F&F Private”. Even after controlling for selection bias, estimations do not show
any signs of F&F finance being used as a substitute for unsuccessfully negotiated lines of
credit.
As another robustness check, the inverse Mills ratio from the selection model is included as
a control variable into IV estimations in comparison to estimations in Section 2.4.3. The
results in Table B.5 in the Appendix confirm that firms use F&F finance in response to
unsuccessfully negotiated loans, but not as a substitute for lines of credit. Unsuccessfully
negotiated loans increase the probability of both “F&F Business” and “F&F Private”
being used by a firm.
In both the OLS and IV estimations, the results suggest that the estimation of the effect
of unsuccessful bank credit negotiations on the use of F&F finance are not affected by
sample selection. The estimated coefficients hardly change compared to the estimations
in which selection bias is not accounted for. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients of
the inverse Mills ratio are statistically insignificant in all estimations.
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2.6.2 The Role of Discouraged Borrowers
The extent to which F&F finance is used as a substitute for unsuccessfully negotiated bank
credit could underestimate the true substitution effect in response to credit constraints if
firms turn to F&F finance before even entering bank credit negotiations. They could do
so, for example, because they expect a rejection of their credit application. Such firms
are generally referred to as discouraged borrowers.
Whether discouraged borrowers provide further evidence in support of the result that
credit constraints drive firms into informal finance can be tested with data from the
Ifo “Financing of the German Economy” survey. If firms did not negotiate about bank
credit, they could report in the survey whether they did not do so because they expected
negotiations with banks to be unsuccessful.
OLS estimations are used to test the significance of the effect of a firm being discour-
aged on the use of F&F finance. The results in Table B.6 in the Appendix suggest that
no further substitution behaviour into informal finance is prevalent because of expected
unsuccessful bank credit negotiations. IV estimations that would allow a causal interpre-
tation are not available here because the data does not contain any suitable instrumental
variables for a firm being discouraged.
2.7 Conclusion
Based on a novel data set from the Ifo “Financing of the German Economy” survey,
this chapter shows that F&F finance is surprisingly widespread among German firms.
Considering that Germany is a highly developed country and that the sample does not
focus on start-up businesses, this deserves special attention. In particular, it is important
to analyse whether bank credit constraints are a cause of the widespread use of this
particular kind of informal finance.
Descriptive statistics show that firms that unsuccessfully negotiate about bank credit are
significantly more likely to use F&F finance. OLS estimations are used to control for
a broad set of firm characteristics that previous literature found to determine a firm’s
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capital structure, its decision to use informal finance, and its risk of facing bank credit
constraints. The results suggest that F&F finance is significantly more likely to be used
if a firm has unsuccessfully negotiated a bank loan. Such an effect is not found for
unsuccessful negotiations of lines of credit.
Since OLS estimations are affected by endogeneity stemming from the fact that F&F
finance may have a signalling effect on banks’ decisions to grant or reject credit, an IV
approach is applied to estimate the causal effect of unsuccessful bank credit negotia-
tions. Thereby, the dummy variable indicating that a bank follows discretionary lending
provides an instrumental variable for unsuccessful bank credit negotiations.
IV estimations show that unsuccessfully negotiated bank loans drive the use of F&F
finance, which highlights its importance in financing specific investment projects. For
working capital finance, however, F&F finance seems less important as there is no signif-
icant effect of unsuccessfully negotiated lines of credit on the use of F&F finance. The
results show that the substitution effect exists for both “F&F Business” and “F&F Pri-
vate”. The comparison of OLS and IV estimators further indicate that “F&F Business”
serves as a positive signal of a firm’s creditworthiness in bank credit negotiations while
evidence of the signalling effect of “F&F Private” is mixed. Robustness checks show that
these findings are unaffected by accounting for sample selection bias. Furthermore, there
is no evidence that discouraged borrowers use F&F finance in response to expectations
of unsuccessful bank credit negotiations.
Since turning to informal sources of finance is associated with higher borrowing costs
(Djankov, Lieberman, Mukherjee, and Nenova, 2003) and welfare gains from financial
intermediation no longer materialise, attention should be paid to the extent to which
firms use informal finance in response to credit constraints. This study provides evidence
that this phenomenon is not only occurring in developing countries or among start-
up businesses, but that it is highly relevant even among established firms in a highly
developed economy.
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Chapter 3
Are Real Effects of Credit Supply
Overestimated? Bias from Firms’
Current Situation and Future
Expectations∗
3.1 Introduction
Designing policy measures in response to credit constraints at the firm-level requires an
understanding of whether they are caused by credit supply-side factors (e.g., a bank liq-
uidity shock) or firm-side factors (e.g., a shock to the firms’ creditworthiness). During the
financial crisis of 2007-09, for example, banks in many countries faced a severe liquidity
shock and reduced their lending to non-financial firms. Lacking access to credit, firms
postponed investment and reduced their business activity. Therefore, credit supply-side
factors caused a slowdown in real economic activity.1 In other countries, however, banks
weathered the financial crisis quite well, yet non-financial firms nevertheless experienced
credit constraints as a reflection of their deteriorating creditworthiness when the world-
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Michael Kleemann.
1This view has been supported by Brunnermeier (2009) and Shleifer and Vishny (2010), whereas
Kahle and Stulz (2013) challenge this “bank credit channel” story.
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wide economic slowdown hit demand for their products.2 According to this narrative,
credit constraints and the economic slowdown were not caused only by credit supply-side,
but also by firm-side factors.
To achieve an unbiased estimation of real effects of credit supply-side factors, these must
be disentangled from firm-side factors. For this purpose, existing empirical studies pri-
marily use control variables from firms’ balance sheets. These mirror past business, but
fail to capture a firm’s current business situation and future expectations, which induce
estimation bias by affecting both credit supply and real economic activity. Market-based
variables can be used to address this issue, but these are available for listed firms only and
may not perfectly capture all contemporaneous and forward-looking firm-side factors.
We address the question of whether not controlling for firms’ current business situation
and future expectations, in addition to balance sheet data, leads to biased estimations
of the real effects of credit supply. The analysis is based on data from the “EBDC
Business Expectations Panel” for Germany between 2003 and 2011, which combines firms’
balance sheets with survey-based assessments of their current business situation and
future expectations.3 The data set provides a time-specific treatment variable indicating
the experience of constrained credit-supply at the firm-level based on monthly panel data
on firms’ perceptions of bank lending supply. Applying ordinary least squares (OLS) and
propensity score matching (PSM) estimation approaches, we estimate the treatment effect
of constrained credit supply on monthly changes in a firm’s production.
We find that the sole reliance on balance sheet data to rule out firm-side factors leads to
an overestimation of credit supply-side effects on real economic activity. When controlling
for balance sheet variables only, OLS and PSM estimations suggest that credit supply-side
factors cause a significant increase in the probability of slowed down firm-level production
during the post-treatment year. However, when including control variables for firms’
current business situation and future expectations, the OLS estimator is significantly
reduced. In PSM estimations, the estimated treatment effect even turns insignificant,
2The International Monetary Fund (2009) describes the economic crisis in Germany following this
pattern.
3German data is particularly suited to analyse the real effects of credit constraints because Germany
is a bank-based economy where many firms do not have access to public market finance as a substitute
for bank credit and may therefore be particularly affected by credit constraints.
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which raises doubts about the importance of credit supply-side shocks in Germany during
the financial crisis. These findings are further supported by estimations using annual firm-
level employment growth as an alternative outcome variable. From our results, we draw
the conclusion that the empirical literature analysing the real effects of credit supply
should develop sufficient approaches to rule out firm heterogeneity that is not captured
by balance sheets.
This analysis contributes to a strand of research on the estimation of the real effects
of credit supply4 at the firm-level.5 In particular, we focus on the question of how to
rule out firm-side factors in such estimations.6 Therefore, the control variables used in
previous empirical studies are of particular interest here.
First, several studies use a combination of balance sheet and market data to rule out
firm-side factors when estimating the real effects of credit supply-side shocks (e.g., on
firms’ investments).7 They all control for different sets of balance sheet variables such as
firm size, cash flow, cash holdings, leverage, and profitability. Since balance sheets are
backward-looking only, all these studies additionally control for at least one market-based
variable (e.g., market-to-book value), assuming that market prices contain all relevant
contemporaneous and forward-looking information about a firm.8
Market data to control for contemporaneous and forward-looking firm-side factors, how-
ever, is only available when firms are publicly traded. Using a sample of both public
and non-public firms, Chodorow-Reich (2014) therefore does not use market data, but
4The link between credit supply and real economic activity was first shown by Bernanke (1983).
Theoretical models including such a bank lending channel were developed by Bernanke and Blinder
(1988), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kashyap and Stein (1994), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010).
5In addition to firm-level studies, Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007), Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache,
and Rajan (2008), and Duygan-Bump, Levkov, and Montoriol-Garriga (2011) analyse the real effects of
credit supply at the sector-level following Rajan and Zingales (1998) by using external finance dependence
of a sector as a measure for financial constraints. Peek and Rosengren (2000) estimate the impact of the
Japanese Banking crisis on the U.S. economy at the macroeconomic level.
6Therefore, the paper is not comparable to the analysis by Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2013), who
deal with the question of how to measure credit constraints.
7Gan (2007), Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010), Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner
(2011), Chava and Purnanandam (2011), and Lin and Paravisini (2012) do so by using financial crises
as credit supply-side shocks, whereas Amiti and Weinstein (2013) identify bank shocks directly.
8Market data is also used to estimate the impact of bank health on firms’ market values, for example
by Yamori and Murakami (1999), Kang and Stulz (2000), Bae, Kang, and Lim (2002), and Ongena,
Smith, and Michalsen (2003).
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controls for firms’ borrowing patterns, size, age, access to public bond markets, and a
set of variables from the Dealscan database when estimating the effect of bank health on
U.S. firm-level employment. In a robustness test, he also applies a within-firm approach
as used by Khwaja and Mian (2008), which does not require controlling for a certain set
of firm characteristics.
To the best of our knowledge, the study by Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) is
the only one that includes control variables explicitly measuring firms’ current business
situation and future expectations in the estimation of real effects of credit supply. Similar
to our analysis, they use survey data to show that self-reported financial constraints
adversely affect several firm-level outcome variables (e.g., planned employment cuts). At
first, they only control for firm size, ownership, industry, and rating category to rule out
firm heterogeneity. Their estimated real effects of financial constraints turn out slightly
smaller, but still significant, when they account for contemporaneous and forward-looking
firm-side factors. They do so by including control variables for profitability, growth
prospects, and dividend payer status. The last variable, however, is also a market-based
variable that is only available for publicly traded firms.
We contribute to the literature on real effects of credit supply by controlling for a large set
of explicit survey-based measures of firms’ current business situation and future expecta-
tions without the need for market data. We test whether the sole reliance on balance sheet
data leads to an overestimation of the real effects of credit supply. Thereby, we amend
the approach of Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) by using panel data instead of
cross-sectional data. Furthermore, the use of monthly survey data allows us to identify
a direct and time-specific treatment variable for constrained credit supply and estimate
its effect on monthly changes in firm-level production, in contrast to analyses based on
annual data and more indirect measures of financial constraints. Finally, we estimate
credit supply-side effects on annual employment growth, which is often not possible due
to a lack of firm-level employment data.9
9A notable exception is the study by Chodorow-Reich (2014), who uses firm-level employment data.
Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) estimate the effects of financial constraints on planned em-
ployment cuts without observing whether these plans are implemented. Duygan-Bump, Levkov, and
Montoriol-Garriga (2011) estimate employment effects of financing constraints at the sector-level by
using workers’ employment status from the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS).
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Our results are also of interest for the estimation of credit supply-side effects on loan out-
comes (without estimating real effects), in which firm-side factors must be held constant
as well. For example, in their analysis of bank-side effects on loan outcomes using Spanish
data, Jimènez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina (2012) control for firm size, leverage, and
liquidity in addition to firm age and credit history. Analysing bank-side effects on credit
rejections in Eastern Europe, Popov and Udell (2012) control for firm size, age, own-
ership, export status, and external auditing. Santos (2011) also includes market-based
firm characteristics as control variables in his analysis of loan pricing during the recent
subprime crisis. Explicit measures of firms’ current situation and future expectations
could amend analyses along this line of research.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 derives the testable hypothesis. Section
3.3 describes the data set, the treatment definition, and provides descriptive statistics for
all outcome and control variables. Section 3.4.1 explains the empirical strategy. Results
for OLS and PSM estimation are presented in Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3. Section 3.5
contains several robustness checks. Section 3.6 discusses the external validity of the
results and Section 3.7 provides concluding remarks.
3.2 Hypothesis
If the treatment of constrained credit supply was randomly assigned to firms, the observed
difference in real economic activity between restricted and unrestricted firms could be in-
terpreted as being caused by credit supply-side factors. Theoretical literature provides
two explanations for why credit constraints could be randomly assigned to firms. Ac-
cording to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), one symptom of credit rationing is the possibility
that one firm is granted bank credit while the credit application of an identical other firm
is rejected. Therefore, credit constraints would be considered to be randomly assigned.
Furthermore, the model by Sharpe (1990) explains differences in credit supply between
otherwise similar firms by heterogeneity in firms’ bank relationships. Empirical evidence
lends support to the argument that the health of relationship banks has an impact on
firms (e.g., Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2011), Santos (2011), and
63
Are Real Effects of Credit Supply Overestimated?
Chodorow-Reich (2014)). This is further supported by studies showing that banks with
different characteristics, such as size and capitalisation, are differently inclined to trans-
mit monetary policy changes to the real sector10 and that they differed in their lending
behaviour during the financial crisis of 2007-09.11
The empirical identification of the real effects of credit supply, however, is complicated
by the fact that a bank’s credit granting decision is typically not random, but depends
on firm-side factors determining a firm’s creditworthiness. If, for example, a firm expe-
riences a product demand shock and its creditworthiness deteriorates, it is more likely
to experience constrained credit supply. It is also more likely to reduce its production,
but it does so in response to the product demand shock, not due to credit supply-side
factors. The observed differences between restricted and unrestricted firms would over-
state the real effects of credit supply-side factors. Alternatively, the observed difference
could understate credit supply-side effects if firms with strong growth potentials share
certain features that make them prone to face constrained credit supply. This could, for
example, be the case for start-up businesses that are young, small, and risky.
Therefore, controlling for firm heterogeneity is crucial to avoid biased estimators of credit
supply-side effects on real economic activity. For this purpose, control variables from
balance sheets provide accurate measures of heterogeneity in firms’ financial conditions.
Balance sheets, however, mirror only past business and fail to capture firms’ current
business situation and future expectations. The latter predict a firm’s future business
activity and when deciding about granting credit, banks consider them (e.g., by looking
at order books, interim financial statements, or business plans). Consequently, such con-
temporaneous and forward-looking firm characteristics, which is not captured by balance
sheets, could induce estimation bias.
Hypothesis: Not explicitly controlling for firms’ current business situation and future
expectations, in addition to balance sheet variables, leads to biased estimations of the
effects of credit supply-side factors on real economic activity.
10See, for example, Kashyap and Stein (2000), Kishan and Opiela (2000), Gambacorta (2005), Kishan
and Opiela (2006), and Jimènez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina (2012).
11See, for example, Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), and Puri,
Rocholl, and Steffen (2011a).
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3.3 Data
3.3.1 The Data Set
For our analysis, we use data from the German “EBDC Business Expectations Panel”.
The data set links firms’ balance sheets from the Bureau van Dyk (BvD) Amadeus
database12 and the Hoppenstedt database13 to panel data from the Ifo Business Survey.14
The latter is a monthly survey asking 3,600 plants from the German manufacturing sector
for appraisals of their current business situation and expectations for their future business.
It provides the basis for the Ifo Business Climate Index, an indicator of economic activity.
For the calculation of the index, the Ifo Institute continuously ensures that the panel of
firms included in the survey is representative of the German manufacturing sector. A
more detailed description of the data set is provided by Becker and Wohlrabe (2008).15
All variables used in this analysis are described in Table 3.1.
The Ifo Business Survey data is well-suited to test our hypothesis for three reasons. First,
firms in the survey report their perception of bank lending supply, from which we can
derive a month-specific treatment variable indicating constrained credit supply at the
firm-level. Second, firms report recent changes in production on a monthly basis, which
provides a precise measure of changes in post-treatment production. Third, and most
importantly, the survey data contains a broad set of appraisals of firms’ current business
situation and future expectations. In combination with balance sheet variables, this
provides a unique opportunity to test how controlling for contemporaneous and forward-
looking firm characteristics affects the estimation of the real effects of credit supply.
12The BvD Amadeus database contains balance sheet data and other firm-specific information about
European firms, including about 1 million mainly non-listed German firms. Its primary source for
Germany is the Creditreform, a German rating agency.
13Hoppenstedt is a leading provider of balance sheet data for German firms. The public press and
commercial registries are among its main data sources. It has almost full coverage of publicly available
financial statements in Germany.
14When linking annual balance sheet and monthly survey data, which is done based on the name and
postal address of the firms, the following issue arises. The fiscal years of some firms in the sample do
not coincide with calendar years. We use the monthly frequency of the data and put the most recently
published balance sheet into every monthly observation. Thereby, we assume that a firm’s balance sheet
is made available in the credit application process immediately at the end of the fiscal year.
15Kipar (2011) uses data from the Ifo Business Survey to test the impact of credit constraints on
firm-level innovation activity.
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Table 3.1: Variable descriptions
Variable Description Freq.
Treatment
Restricted Change in perception of bank lending from “accommo-
dating” or “normal” to “restrictive”
Monthly
Variables of interest
Slowdown Production decreased at least once in the last 12 months Monthly
Slowdown_avg Fraction of last 12 months in which production de-
creased
Monthly
∆Empl Year-on-year employment growth rate Annual
Empl_decrease Negative ∆Empl Annual
Firm size
Empl Number of employees at company-level Annual
Assets Total assets Annual
Balance sheet data
Equity Equity / Assets Annual
Cash Cash holdings / Assets Annual
Long-term debt Long-term debt / Assets Annual
Short-term debt Short-term debt / Assets Annual
Cash flow Cash flow / Assets Annual
ROA Operating profit / Assets Annual
Interest coverage Operating profit / Interest expenses Annual
Current business situation
State Appraisal: Current business situation Monthly
(good / satisfactory / bad)
Orders Appraisal: Stock of orders Monthly
(high / enough / too small)
Production Production during last month Monthly
(increased / unchanged / decreased)
Short-time Firm currently uses short-time work Quarterly
Export Firm is exporting Quarterly
Future expectations
State exp Expected business over next 6 months Monthly
(improvement / no change / worsening)
Empl exp Expected employment over next 3 months Monthly
(increase / no change / decrease)
Headcount Employees for demand over next 12 months Quarterly
(too few / enough / too many)
Short-time exp Expecting to use short-time work during next 3 months Quarterly
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3.3.2 The Treatment of Constrained Credit Supply
Based on the panel structure of the data, we derive a variable indicating that a firm
receives the treatment of constrained credit supply in a particular month. Since 2003,
firms in the Ifo Business Survey are asked how they perceive “banks’ willingness to supply
credit”. Possible appraisal categories are “restrictive”, “normal”, and “accommodating”.
This enables us to directly measure a change in credit supply to a firm. We define a firm as
restricted or treated in month t (Restrictedi,t = 1) if it reports “restrictive” bank lending
in month t after reporting “normal” or “accommodating” bank lending in the previous
twelve months. A firm is defined as unrestricted or untreated in t (Restrictedi,t = 0)
if it reports “normal” or “accommodating” bank lending in twelve subsequent months
and does not switch to reporting “restrictive“ bank lending in month t. This treatment
definition allows the estimation of a treatment effect without bias from possible previous
treatments. However, it comes at the cost of using only a fraction of the firms in the
panel data set.
Estimating the treatment effect on a monthly basis requires an assumption on the exact
treatment month for the time from 2003 to September 2008 in which the survey question
on credit supply is asked only twice a year, namely in March and August. If a firm
switches to reporting “restrictive” bank lending between two surveys in this time period,
we assume that the treatment of constrained credit supply occurs in the first month after
a firm has reported “normal” or “accommodating” the last time. This assumption is
further illustrated and discussed in Appendix A.
After conditioning on the availability of all control variables in the pre-treatment month
t-1 (see Sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5), the sample consists of 333 firm-month observations in
the treatment group and 5,061 untreated firm-month observations in the control group.16
Figure 1 in Appendix C shows the distribution of treated observations over time. As
expected, the number of treated firms increases sharply in the wake of the financial
crisis.
16The number of observations used in the following analysis is somewhat lower because of missing
data in the post-treatment outcome variables.
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Our approach to measuring credit supply is similar to the one used by Campello, Graham,
and Harvey (2010), who also use survey data to identify financial constraints at the firm-
level. Such a perception-based approach has the caveat that the definition of what firms
consider to be restrictive bank lending may differ over time or across industries. In the
OLS estimations, this problem is dealt with by the inclusion of time and industry dummy
variables. PSM estimation allows an even more stringent solution, namely matching firms
exactly on quarter-industry cells.
3.3.3 Measuring Firm-Level Real Economic Activity
The Ifo Business Survey provides a precise measure of firm-level real economic activ-
ity. On a monthly basis, firms report whether their production has “increased”, “not
changed”, or “decreased” during the last month compared to the month before. An-
swers to this question in every month from t+1 to t+12 measure changes in firm-level
production after the treatment of constrained credit supply is assigned in month t.
The main dependent variable in the following analysis is the variable Slowdowni,t+12,
which indicates that a firm reports a decrease in production at least once during the
twelve post-treatment months. We focus our analysis on this negative outcome because
we are primarily concerned about restraining effects of credit supply. As a robustness
check, we also run estimations using the outcome variable Slowdown_avgi,t+12, which
measures the fraction of the twelve post-treatment months in which a firm reports a
decreasing production.
Furthermore, we estimate the treatment effect of constrained credit supply on a firm’s
annual employment growth rate ∆Empli,t+12, which is calculated as the symmetric growth
rate
∆Empli,t+12 =
Empli,t+12 − Empli,t
0.5(Empli,t+12 + Empli,t)
(3.1)
as suggested by Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2013) and applied by Chodorow-
Reich (2014). To avoid estimations being affected by extreme values due to survey re-
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sponse behaviour, one percent of the observations are cut off from both sides of the
distribution of ∆Empli,t+12.
A caveat in the employment data stems from the fact that firms report their number of
employees in the Ifo Business Survey every year in November. As the treatment variable
is defined on a monthly basis, this raises difficulties in the distinction between post-
treatment and pre-treatment changes in employment. Appendix B contains a discussion
of this issue and presents the conservative approach to deal with it in this study. Nev-
ertheless, the exact level of the employment effects of credit supply estimated should be
interpreted with caution. Therefore, we use the dummy variable Empl_decreasei,t+12
indicating that a firm has a negative post-treatment employment growth rate as an al-
ternative dependent variable.
Table 3.2: Firms’ post-treatment business activity
Restrictedi,t = 1 Restrictedi,t = 0
t+12 N X¯R σR N X¯U σU p > t
Production
Slowdown 316 69.9% 0.46 4877 52.5% 0.50 0.000***
Slowdown_avg 316 23.5% 0.24 4877 13.6% 0.19 0.000***
Employment
∆Empl 302 -1.5% 0.12 4739 1.0% 0.10 0.000***
Empl_decrease 314 46.8% 0.50 4827 31.8% 0.47 0.000***
Notes: The table shows the descriptive statistics of post-treatment outcome variables separately for
treated and untreated firms; treatment status Restrictedi,t is defined as described in Section 3.3.2; p-
values are reported for a two-group mean comparison t-test with H0: X¯R = X¯U ; ∆Empl is cut by
one percent from both sides of the distribution to deal with extreme values; these observations are kept
in Empl_decrease; the samples contain only observations for which all pre-treatment control variables
listed in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 are available; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
According to Table 3.2, firms that experience the treatment of constrained credit supply
in t show significantly lower post-treatment real economic activity than untreated firms
in all four outcome variables. They are significantly more likely to report a decreasing
production at least once during the post-treatment year. On average, restricted firms face
decreasing production in almost a quarter of the twelve post-treatment months while this
figure is 10 percentage points lower for unrestricted firms. Employment growth rates show
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that restricted firms are shrinking by 1.5 percent on average in the post-treatment year
while unrestricted firms grow by 1.0 percent. Finally, the probability of a decreasing
employment is 15 percentage points higher for a restricted firm.
3.3.4 Heterogeneity in Firms’ Balance Sheets
Table 3.3 illustrates how restricted and unrestricted firms differ in pre-treatment size and
balance sheet variables Bi,t−1. These variables are often used in the literature to control
for firm-side factors when estimating the real effects of credit supply. Firm size is widely
used as a predictor of financial constraints because large firms tend to be older and more
transparent, which may facilitate access to credit. In Table 3.3, however, restricted and
unrestricted firms do not differ significantly in log(Empl) or log(Assets).
Table 3.3: Firms’ balance sheets in t-1
Restrictedi,t = 1 Restrictedi,t = 0
(N=333) (N=5,061)
t-1 X¯R XmedR σR X¯U XmedU σU p > t
Firm size
log(Empl) 5.4 5.3 1.3 5.5 5.4 1.1 0.25
log(Assets) 17.1 16.9 1.7 17.2 17.0 1.6 0.38
Balance sheet data
Equity 33.2% 31.1% 25.4% 39.2% 38.3% 21.9% 0.000***
Cash 10.0% 4.3% 12.8% 11.3% 5.7% 13.8% 0.08*
Long-term debt 15.4% 7.7% 19.7% 13.4% 6.4% 17.5% 0.05*
Short-term debt 32.7% 30.2% 24.1% 30.7% 25.7% 40.6% 0.36
Cash flow 7.9% 7.8% 11.9% 10.5% 9.6% 12.2% 0.000***
ROA -8.1% 3.0% 38.6% -8.3% 6.1% 47.7% 0.93
Interest coverage 17.4 1.3 42.3 22.9 4.4 46.5 0.03**
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics of pre-treatment variables Bi,t−1 separately for treated
and untreated firms; treatment status Restrictedi,t is defined as described in Section 3.3.2; p-values are
reported for a two-group mean comparison t-test with H0: X¯R = X¯U ; Interest coverage is set to zero
if values are negative and is winsorized at the 95 percentile; the samples contain only observations for
which all pre-treatment control variables listed here and in Table 3.4 are available; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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The other variables in Table 3.3 are in line with existing empirical literature showing
that restricted firms are in a worse financial condition than unrestricted ones. They
have significantly lower equity ratios, fewer cash holdings, more long-term debt, lower
cash flows, and lower interest coverage ratios.17 Restricted firms also hold more short-
term debt and are characterised by a lower operating profitability (ROA). Therefore, it
is important to rule out heterogeneity in firms’ balance sheets in the estimation of real
effects of credit supply.
3.3.5 Heterogeneity in Firms’ Current Business Situation and
Future Expectations
Beyond the information contained in balance sheets, Table 3.4 shows that restricted and
unrestricted firms also differ significantly in their pre-treatment current business situation
Ci,t−1 and future expectations Fi,t−1. All variables stem from the firms’ appraisals and
assessments reported in the Ifo Business Survey.
First, firms are asked directly how they appraise their current business situation. Re-
stricted firms are significantly less likely to report a “good” situation (State (+)), but
significantly more likely to report a “bad” one (State(-)).18 Second, firms provide an
assessment of their current stock of orders, which restricted firms are significantly more
likely to report as being “too small” (Orders (-)). Third, restricted firms are significantly
more likely to report a decreasing production in the pre-treatment month (Production
(-)), which indicates a pre-treatment trend in the outcome variable for real economic
activity. Finally, variables indicating that a firm is currently using short-time work and
whether it is exporting do not show any significant differences.19
17Interest coverage is set to zero if it takes on negative values and winsorised at the 95 percentile.
18Throughout this paper, only good and bad appraisals or assessments are reported for variables from
the Ifo Business Survey. Neutral categories constitute the baseline category in all estimations.
19Short-time work is a labour market instrument widely used by German firms to adjust their capac-
ities to business cycle or seasonal demand fluctuations. The practice was particularly widespread during
the financial crisis. Export status is a crucial control variable because foreign demand in Germany was
severely affected by the financial crisis, which could affect both access to credit and real economic activity
of a firm.
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Forward-looking firm characteristics in the data show further heterogeneity between re-
stricted and unrestricted firms that might not be captured by backward-looking balance
sheet variables. As shown in Table 3.4, restricted firms are significantly less likely to
expect business to “improve” over the next six months (State exp (+)), but significantly
more likely to expect business to “worsen” (State exp (-)).
Table 3.4: Firms’ current business situation and future expectations in t-1
Restrictedi,t = 1 Restrictedi,t = 0
(N=333) (N=5,061)
t-1 X¯R XmedR σR X¯U XmedU σU p > t
Current business situation
State (+) 21.6% 0 41.2% 25.9% 0 43.8% 0.08*
State (-) 27.9% 0 44.9% 20.8% 0 40.6% 0.002***
Orders (+) 10.5% 0 30.7% 13.0% 0 33.6% 0.19
Orders (-) 39.3% 0 48.9% 32.9% 0 47.0% 0.02**
Production (+) 12.3% 0 32.9% 14.4% 0 35.1% 0.29
Production (-) 23.7% 0 42.6% 19.3% 0 39.5% 0.05*
Short-time 13.2% 0 33.9% 14.5% 0 35.2% 0.53
Export 87.4% 1 33.2% 88.6% 1 31.8% 0.50
Future expectations
State exp (+) 15.3% 0 36.1% 19.0% 0 39.2% 0.09*
State exp (-) 25.5% 0 43.7% 18.8% 0 39.1% 0.002***
Empl exp (+) 5.7% 0 23.2% 6.6% 0 24.9% 0.51
Empl exp (-) 23.1% 0 42.2% 15.8% 0 36.5% 0.000***
Headcount (+) 5.7% 0 23.2% 6.3% 0 24.3% 0.67
Headcount (-) 27.0% 0 44.5% 20.1% 0 40.1% 0.002***
Short-time exp 19.2% 0 39.5% 19.7% 0 39.8% 0.82
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics of pre-treatment variables Ci,t−1 and Fi,t−1 separately
for treated and untreated firms; treatment status Restrictedi,t is defined as described in Section 3.3.2;
p-values are reported for a two-group mean comparison t-test with H0: X¯R = X¯U ; the samples contain
only observations for which all pre-treatment control variables listed here and in Table 3.3 are available;
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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This picture is confirmed for the variable indicating that a firm expects its employment
figures to decrease over the next three months (Empl exp (-)) and the variable indicating
that a firm considers its workforce too large for the product demand over the next twelve
months (Headcount (-)). There is no such difference in the expectation of short-time
work (Short-time exp).
In sum, variables measuring firms’ current business situation and future expectations are
highly relevant in predicting constrained credit supply. As a firm’s production and em-
ployment decisions also depend on its current business situation and future expectations,
heterogeneity in these variables must be controlled for to ensure an unbiased estimation
of the real effects of credit supply. As balance sheet variables are backward-looking only,
additional control variables from survey data could provide a key contribution in this
concern.
3.4 Methodology and Results
3.4.1 Methodology
For every firm i in the panel data set, we observe whether it receives a treatment of
constrained credit supply in month t (Restrictedi,t = 1) and estimate the effect of this
treatment on the likelihood of a decrease in production during the subsequent twelve
months (Slowdowni,t+12 = 1).20 In a first step, we estimate
E[Slowdowni,t+12|Bi,t−1] = βB0 + βB1 Restrictedi,t + βB2 Bi,t−1 + i (3.2)
where Bi,t−1 is a set of variables from a firm’s most recent balance sheet in the pre-
treatment month t-1.
20We illustrate the empirical strategy based on the notation of an OLS estimation. In Section 3.4.3,
we also test the hypothesis using PSM estimation.
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We then extend the estimation to
E[Slowdowni,t+12|Bi,t−1, Ci,t−1, Fi,t−1] = βBCF0 + βBCF1 Restrictedi,t + βBCF2 Bi,t−1 (3.3)
+ βBCF3 Ci,t−1 + βBCF4 Fi,t−1 + ζi
by additionally controlling for a set of survey-based variables measuring firms’ pre-
treatment current business situation Ci,t−1 and expectations for the future business Fi,t−1.
Finally, we calculate the impact of these additional control variables on the estimated
treatment effect as
DiffCF = βB1 − βBCF1 (3.4)
which measures the degree to which the estimated real effects of credit supply are biased
when controlling for balance sheet variables only, without accounting for heterogeneity
in firms’ current business situation and future expectations.
3.4.2 Ordinary Least Squares Estimations
Pooled OLS estimation provides a first test of whether controlling for firms’ current busi-
ness situation and future expectations affects the estimation of the real effects of credit
supply. In line with Equation (1) in Section 3.4.1, the dummy variable Slowdowni,t+12
is regressed on the treatment status Restrictedi,t, a set of balance sheet variables Bi,t−1,
and quarter and industry dummy variables based on the two-digit WZ 2008 industry
classification. The results in Estimation (1) in Table 3.5 suggest that constrained credit
supply increases the probability of decreasing production between t and t+12 by 8.65
percentage points.
When additionally controlling for firms’ current business situation Ci,t−1 and future expec-
tations Fi,t−1 in Estimation (2), this effect is reduced to 7.01 percentage points. Column
(3) shows that the difference between the two estimated coefficients is highly statistically
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significant.21 The adjusted R2 statistics further show that the inclusion of the control
variables Ci,t−1 and Fi,t−1 increases the explanatory power of the model substantially.
Therefore, OLS estimation provides first support for the hypothesis that not controlling
for contemporaneous and forward-looking firm-side factors leads to a significant over-
estimation of the impact of credit supply-side factors on real economic activity at the
firm-level. The inclusion of survey-based measures for firms’ current business situation
and future expectations reduces the estimated effect by almost 20 percent.
Table 3.5: OLS estimations using Slowdowni,t+12
(1) (2) βB1 − βBCF1
Restricted 0.0865*** 0.0701*** 0.0164**
(0.027) (0.026)
Firm size Yes Yes
Balance sheet data Yes Yes
Current situation No Yes
Future expectations No Yes
Month Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.1666 0.2200
N 5,193 5,193
Notes: The table provides results for OLS estimations of Slowdowni,t+12 on the treatment status
Restrictedi,t and different sets of pre-treatment control variables; standard errors (reported in parenthe-
ses) are clustered at the firm-level; “Firm size”, “Balance sheet data”, “Current situation”, and “Future
expectations” are sets of control variables as listed in Table 3.1; industry dummy variables are included
based on the two-digit WZ 2008 industry classification; the two samples contain only those observations
for which all control variables of Estimation (2) are available; the third column provides the difference
between the two estimated coefficients; its significance is tested using a t-test with H0: βB1 = βBCF1
based on Clogg, Petkova, and Haritou (1995); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
21To test this significance, standard test procedures are not applicable because the two coefficients
come from different estimations. Therefore, the significance level for the test procedure that Clogg,
Petkova, and Haritou (1995) have developed for such a case is reported here.
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3.4.3 Propensity Score Matching Estimations
OLS estimation has two potential disadvantages in the context of this analysis. First,
it contains the risk of misspecifying the functional form of E[Slowdowni,t+12]. Second,
OLS estimation leads to a comparison of observations outside the common support if
distributions of control variables vary between treated and untreated firms. This is
most likely to be a problem for the balance sheet variables Bi,t−1, which show large
standard errors that differ between treated and untreated firms according to Table 3.3.
To address these issues, the effect of constrained credit supply on firm-level production
can be estimated using a matching estimation approach, as done by Campello, Graham,
and Harvey (2010) and Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2011).
The following analysis is based on PSM estimation following Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) because the large number of control variables, including continuous balance sheet
variables in Bi,t−1, inhibits the identification of matching firms that are identical with
respect to all control variables. Comparing each restricted firm to unrestricted ones with
a similar propensity score provides an estimated treatment effect that is close to the one
derived from an experimental setting (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999) in which restrictive
bank lending is randomly assigned. The identifying assumption still hinges on the choice
of matching variables. In this concern, our study provides a major contribution to the
existing literature by using a broad set of matching variables
Following the empirical strategy in Section 3.4.1, firms are first matched on balance sheet
variables Bi,t−1 only. This requires the estimation of a logistic regression model
Pr(Restrictedi,t = 1|Bi,t−1) = Φ(α0 + α1Bi,t−1 + α2Industryi > ui) (3.5)
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution and
Industryi is a set of industry dummy variables.22 To allow for time-heterogeneous effects,
estimations are run separately within every quarter.23
22To avoid the impact of extreme values on the estimation, the delta deviance influence statistic
is extracted for every observation. Following Agresti and Finlay (2008), an observation is dropped if√|ddeviance| > 3 and the maximum likelihood estimation is re-run until no observations are dropped.
23Estimations within quarter-industry cells are not possible due to a lack of observations. We therefore
estimate the model separately for every quarter and include industry dummy variables.
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From the estimated models, the propensity score, which is the conditional probability
of being treated, is predicted for every firm-month observation. Every restricted firm is
then linked to unrestricted firms from the same quarter-industry cell that have a simi-
lar propensity score based on ten nearest neighbours matching. Using exact matching
on quarter-industry cells rules out macroeconomic and industry-specific effects, and deals
with both the time- and industry-dependence of the perception-based treatment variable.
Finally, the treatment effect is estimated using a Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estima-
tion of the outcome variable Slowdowni,t+12 on the treatment status Restrictedi,t with
weights being drawn from the PSM procedure. In a second step, we re-run this match-
ing procedure adding matching variables for firms’ current business situations Ci,t−1 and
future expectations Fi,t−1 in addition to Bi,t−1.
Table 3.6: PSM estimation using Slowdowni,t+12
(1) (2) βB1 − βBCF1
Restricted 5.10%** 2.59% 2.51%
(0.0236) (0.0297)
Industry Yes Yes
Firm size Yes Yes
Balance sheet data Yes Yes
Current situation No Yes
Future expectations No Yes
p>t 0.03 0.38
Upper bound 8.98% 7.47%
Lower bound 1.22% -2.30%
Treated obs. 223 141
Matching obs. 1,351 806
Notes: The table provides results for WLS estimations of Slowdowni,t+12 on the treatment status
Restrictedi,t; in Estimation (1), weights are derived from PSM based on pre-treatment firm size and
balance sheet data; in Estimation (2), weights are derived from PSM based on pre-treatment firm
size, balance sheet data, current business situation, and future expectations; industry dummy variables
based on the two-digit WZ 2008 industry classification are also included in all PSM estimations; p-
values are reported for a t-test of significance of the estimated treatment effect; the significance of
the difference between the two estimated effects in the third column cannot be tested; upper and lower
bounds are reported for the 95 percent confidence interval of each estimator; standard errors are reported
in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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When matching only on balance sheet variables, the results for Estimation (1) in Table
3.6 suggest that constrained credit supply increases the probability of a decreasing pro-
duction in the post-treatment year significantly by 5.10 percentage points. Estimation
(2), however, shows that this treatment effect is only 2.59 percentage points and statis-
tically insignificant when also matching on firms’ current business situation and future
expectations.
This suggests that the sole reliance on balance sheet data leads to an overestimation of real
effects of credit supply-side factors by almost 50 percent.24 Unfortunately, the statistical
significance of the difference between the two estimators cannot be tested because the
test by Clogg, Petkova, and Haritou (1995) requires each observation to receive the same
weight in both estimations, which is contrary to the core idea of a matching estimator.
It is particularly noteworthy that Estimation (2) shows no evidence for credit supply-
side effects on real economic activity in Germany between 2003 and 2011 as suggested
in Estimation (1). Therefore, PSM estimation strengthens the empirical support for the
hypothesis that a lack of control variables to measure firms’ current business situations
and future expectations leads to an overestimation of real effects of credit supply.
3.5 Robustness Checks
3.5.1 Potential Caveats of the Survey Data
The survey questions raise three problems in the context of our analysis. First, re-
spondents could be in a bad mood because of their firm’s general situation and future
expectations, and react by reporting restrictive bank lending (e.g., to blame banks for
their situation). Therefore, the lower estimated effect of constrained credit supply could
not be attributed to survey-based variables providing information that is not captured
by balance sheets. Empirical evidence by Abberger, Birnbrich, and Seiler (2009) provides
strong evidence against this critique. They use data from a meta-study among respon-
24Table C.1 in Appendix C shows that matching on balance sheet variables only does not eliminate
bias in the survey-based variables entirely. Matching on all variables for firms’ current business situation
and future expectations improves the balancing properties.
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dents of the Ifo Business Survey to show that general mood and economy-wide factors
are not important determinants of firms’ general appraisals in the survey.
Second, when providing appraisals of their current business situation, firms may just have
their financial situation and therefore their balance sheet in mind. If that was the case,
the smaller estimated effects when including survey-based control variables would only
be mechanical due to the fact that more control variables are used. For firms’ current
business situation, their revenues and turnover are the most important determinants
according to Abberger, Birnbrich, and Seiler (2009). There is no evidence that firms
think about their financial situation when filling out the survey.
Finally, forward-looking appraisals could contain expectations of constrained credit sup-
ply. In this case, the explanatory power of these variables would mean that firms’ an-
ticipation of the treatment turn out correct, but it could not be taken as evidence for
the importance of ruling out forward-looking firm-side factors. For firms’ future expecta-
tions, Abberger, Birnbrich, and Seiler (2009) show that costs and liquidity, which could
encompass the consequences of constrained credit supply, are only the fourth and fifth
most important determinants.
We test the robustness of our results with respect to the anticipation of constrained credit
supply by re-running the estimations controlling only for those survey-based variables that
explicitly refer to factual aspects of business. These are assessments of the current stock of
orders, as well as the current status concerning short-time work and export. We also keep
the variables Headcount (+) and Headcount (-) as they refer explicitly to employment
figures relative to future demand and are therefore unaffected by firms’ expectations
of access to credit supply. The general appraisals State, Production, State exp, Short-
time exp, and Empl exp are excluded because they could be affected by expectations of
constrained credit supply.
Table C.2 in Appendix C shows that controlling for such a reduced set of variables for
firms’ current business situation and future expectations in OLS estimations leads to a
significant reduction of the estimated credit supply-side effects by 1.5 percentage points.
The difference is only slightly smaller than in our baseline estimation in Section 3.4.2, and
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is still highly statistically significant.25 The adjusted R2 statistic increases substantially
suggesting a better model fit in Estimation (2) even when using a reduced set of variables.
This is confirmed by PSM estimations with a reduced set of control variables. Matching
on balance sheet variables only leads to an estimated treatment effect of 5.74 percentage
points in Estimation (1) in Table C.3 in Appendix C. Controlling for the factual assess-
ments of firms’ current situation and future expectations without using general appraisals
lowers the estimated effect to 3.16 percentage points in Estimation (2) and the estimator
turns statistically insignificant.
Therefore, even if the power of general assessments of contemporaneous and forward-
looking firm-side factors are not to be believed, the omission of more factual variables
still induces an overestimation of real effects of credit supply. For both the OLS and
PSM estimation the suggested overestimation is only slightly smaller than in estimations
based on all survey-based variables in Section 3.4.2 and 3.4.3.
3.5.2 An Alternative Measure for Firm-Level Production
So far, results were shown for the estimated effects of constrained credit supply on the
probability that a firm reports a decreasing production at least once in the twelve post-
treatment months (Slowdowni,t+12). As a robustness check, we re-run the previous es-
timations using the fraction of the twelve post-treatment months in which firms report
decreasing production (Slowdown_avgi,t+12) as the dependent variable.
The results for OLS estimations in Table C.4 in Appendix C show that the omission of
control variables for firms’ current business situation and future expectations lowers the
estimated treatment effect of Restrictedi,t on Slowdown_avgi,t+12 by about 12 percent.
The difference is statistically significant and the adjusted R2 statistic indicates a much
better model fit when including contemporaneous and forward-looking control variables.
25The effect when controlling only for balance sheets variables differs from the one shown in Table
3.5. Although control variables do not change compared to the estimation in Table 3.5, conditioning on
the availability of the smaller set of control variables in Estimation (2) affects the sample composition,
and therefore alters the estimated effect.
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When applying PSM estimation with Slowdown_avgi,t+12 as the dependent variable,
this is confirmed. Matching on balance sheet variables only, Estimation (1) in Table
C.5 shows a highly significant credit supply-side effect on firm-level production of 3.78
percentage points. Adding matching variables for firms’ current business situation and
future expectations in Estimation (2) substantially lowers the effect by 1.01 percentage
points. In contrast to estimations using Slowdowni,t+12, however, the effect remains
significant at the ten percent level. Even when using an alternative outcome variable for
firm-level production, these estimation results underline the importance of controlling for
firms’ current business situation and future expectations in the estimation of real effects
of credit supply.
3.5.3 Employment Effects
The previous estimated effects of constrained credit supply on firm-level production raise
the question whether the omission of variables capturing contemporaneous and forward-
looking firm-side factors also affects the estimation of employment effects of constrained
credit supply. Tables C.6 and C.7 in Appendix C show that controlling for firms’ current
business situation and future expectations lowers the estimated effect of constrained
credit supply on a firm’s annual employment growth rate. The difference is statistically
significant in the OLS estimation. For PSM estimation, the effect turns insignificant and
the two effects lie outside each other’s 95 percent confidence intervals. As mentioned in
Section 3.3.3, the exact level of the estimated employment effects should be interpreted
with caution due to the problems in linking annual employment data to the monthly
treatment variable (see Appendix B for a discussion).
Table C.8 in Appendix C therefore provides OLS estimations of credit supply-side effects
on the probability that a firm experiences a negative employment growth rate in the
post-treatment year (Empl_decreasei,t+12). The inclusion of control variables for firms’
current business situation and future expectations lowers the estimated effect significantly
and the adjusted R2 statistic increases substantially. PSM estimations in Table C.9 in
Appendix C further show that the estimated treatment effect of constrained credit supply
turns insignificant when including all control variables. The two estimators lie outside
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each others’ 95 percent confidence intervals. In sum, these results show that heterogene-
ity in firms’ current business situation and future expectations that is not captured by
balance sheet data also affects the estimation of employment effects of constrained credit
supply.
3.5.4 Sample Selection in PSM Estimations
The differences between PSM estimations with and without matching on firms’ current
business situation and future expectations could be caused by the mere fact that differ-
ent samples of treated firms are used in the two estimations, which is obvious from the
numbers of observations. The samples differ for three reasons. First, when matching on
additional variables Ci,t−1 and Fi,t−1, the logistic regression may no longer converge in
some quarters so that the propensity score is not estimated for the respective treated
observations. Second, the inclusion of these binary variables may induce perfect pre-
dictability so that some variables and the respective treated observations are dropped.
Finally, increasing the number of matching variables makes it more likely that observa-
tions are dropped because the common support condition is violated.
To test whether the previous results are actually driven by better matching quality, post-
treatment outcome variables for the treated firms in both samples are compared in Table
C.10 in Appendix C. For Slowdowni,t+12, firms differ only slightly. In fact, firms in the
second sample show an even larger probability of decreasing production, which strength-
ens the interpretation that solely matching on balance sheet data induces an overestima-
tion of the real effects of credit supply. Two-group mean comparison tests indicate that
the difference is statistically insignificant. The same holds for Slowdown_avgi,t+12. For
Empl_decreasei,t+12 and ∆Empli,t+12, parts of the reduction in the estimated treatment
effect of constrained credit supply can be explained by differences between the treated
firms, but the difference is statistically insignificant and there is still a substantial reduc-
tion remaining due to improved matching quality.
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3.5.5 The Role of the Financial Crisis of 2007-09
The sample period from 2003 to 2011 covers the financial crisis, which might influence
the extent to which omitting firms’ current business situation and future expectations
affect the estimation of the real effects of credit supply. Firms were operating under
extreme conditions during the financial crisis. Therefore, firm balance sheet data from
previous years turned less informative for banks. Under such circumstances, banks may
base their lending decisions even more on contemporaneous and forward-looking firm
characteristics.
As Tables C.11 and C.12 in Appendix C show, controlling for firms’ current business
situation and future expectations lowers the estimated treatment effect of constrained
credit supply on firm-level production in the financial crisis subsample as of July 2007.
For the pre-crisis sample, however, estimates are unreliable because only a few firms are
treated in this period and the sample turns out too small for our estimation procedure.
Therefore, the subsample analysis underlines the importance of contemporaneous and
forward-looking information on firms in times of financial crisis when balance sheet data
from previous years might turn less informative. Whether there is a difference compared
to normal times, however, remains open for future research when more “non-crisis” data
is available.
3.6 Discussion: No Real Effects of Credit Supply?
Most PSM estimations in this paper show no significant effect of credit supply-side factors
on real economic activity. This contrasts what appears to be conventional wisdom;, for
example about the financial crisis of 2007-09. The insignificant effects may be specific to
this study because it is based on data from Germany where the economic crisis was less
driven by bank-side factors.
According to the International Monetary Fund (2009), the economic crisis in the German
economy, which depends strongly on exports, was induced by a sharp drop in foreign
demand. Problems in the banking sector arose because firms were unable to repay their
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debt and increasing uncertainty prevented banks from lending. This, however, is in line
with credit constraints being driven by firm-side, and not by credit supply-side factors.
Supporting this view, Rottmann and Wollmershaeuser (2013) show that capital ratios of
German banks rose from 4% early 2008 to 4.5% by the end of 2009. They also argue that
the establishment of the Financial Markets Stabilization Fund in October 2008 helped
avoid liquidity constraints in the banking sector. Therefore, it is not surprising that
previous PSM estimations did not provide evidence for real effects of credit supply in
Germany between 2003 and 2011.
Concerning the external validity of these results, we wish to emphasise that this picture
may be different for other time periods or other countries. However, the finding that
a lack of controlling for contemporaneous and forward-looking firm-side factors leads to
overestimated credit supply-side effects, is generally applicable.
3.7 Conclusion
To design appropriate policy measures encountering a lack of access to credit for firms, it
is crucial to understand whether this is driven by credit supply-side or firm-side factors. If
economic growth is slowed down by limited lending due to credit supply-side factors (e.g.,
due to banks facing a liquidity crunch), government intervention in the banking sector
may be justifiable. If, however, growth rates are hampered by firm-side factors (e.g.,
a drop in demand for the firms’ products), and credit volumes decrease in response to
higher default risk of firms, government intervention, if such is deemed necessary, should
not necessarily be directed at banks.
To identify credit supply-side effects on real economic activity, firm-side effects must be
ruled out. Existing firm-level analyses do so primarily using data from firms’ balance
sheets. Although these provide an accurate picture of a firm’s financial condition, they
are backward-looking and do not contain information on firms’ current business situation
and future expectations. Therefore, analyses are often complemented with market data,
which limits empirical studies to publicly traded firms.
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This study analyses the question of whether controlling for survey-based measures of
firms’ current business situation and future expectations makes a difference in the es-
timation of the real effects of credit supply. To that end, we estimate the effect of
constrained credit supply on firm-level production in Germany between 2003 and 2011.
When including survey-based appraisals of firms’ current business situation and future
expectations, in addition to balance sheet variables, OLS estimators remain significant,
but turn out significantly lower than without these additional control variables. When
applying a PSM approach, the estimated treatment effect of credit supply on firm-level
production is also substantially reduced and turns insignificant. The importance of ruling
out contemporaneous and forward-looking firm-side factors is further shown for estima-
tions of the effects of constrained credit supply on firm-level employment growth.
Our results indicate that ignoring contemporaneous and forward-looking information on
the credit demand-side may lead to an overestimation of credit supply-side effects on real
economic activity. Studies analysing the real effects of credit supply should take this into
account. For firm-level analyses, micro-data from surveys are an option for circumventing
overestimation if other data (e.g., market data or precise information on order books) are
not available. For macro-level analyses, indices such as the Purchasing Mangers Index
(PMI) could be used. Further research using data for publicly traded firms could also
shed light on the question whether the direct measures for firms’ current situation and
future expectations rule out bias that is not captured by market data.
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Appendix: Sample Representativeness
As the analysis in Chapter 1 is based on survey data, response behaviour could prompt
sample selection issues. Firms with impaired credit finance could be overrepresented in
the sample since the topic of the survey was the firms’ financing situation. One could
argue that firms that did not need credit finance and those that did not experience any
impairments of it were less likely to participate in the survey because they lack interest
in the topic or they did not consider themselves to have anything to contribute.
To test whether certain firms are overrepresented in the sample, we compare firms re-
sponding to the Ifo “Financing of the German Economy” survey (“response” firms) to
those who did not respond (“non-response” firms) with respect to information that the
Ifo Investment Survey provides about both groups. Since both surveys are based on the
same address database, there is a sufficient overlap between the data sets. That firms
with impaired credit finance are also overrepresented in the sample of the Ifo Investment
Survey is unlikely because the main topic of this survey is the development and the struc-
ture of firms’ investment activities. The motivation to respond should therefore not be
affected by the firm’s credit financing during the financial crisis.
The first two columns of Table A.1 show that response firms are slightly larger than
non-response firms in terms of employment and turnover in 2010, but the differences are
statistically insignificant. Even stronger arguments in favour of sample representative-
ness can be found in the lower part of Table A.1. Every year, firms participating in
the Ifo Investment Survey are asked to assess how the financing situation affects their
investment in the current year. The answers range from 1 (“strong animation”) to 5
(“strong slowdown”). If firms that see credit finance impaired by the financial crisis were
to be more likely to respond to the Ifo “Financing of the German Economy” survey, we
would expect the according answers in the Ifo Investment Survey to differ significantly
between response and non-response firms. Table A.1, however, shows no difference in the
influence of finance on investment between the two groups.
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Table A.1: Analysis of response behaviour based on data from the Ifo Investment
Survey
Non-response Response p > t
Turnover (2010, in m Euro) 265.68 398.94 0.2811
N 1,118 591
Employment (2010) 808.49 1050.32 0.3881
N 1,118 591
Influence Finance 2007 2.96 2.93 0.4737
N 809 444
Influence Finance 2008 3.05 3.03 0.5120
N 859 468
Influence Finance 2009 3.38 3.41 0.4632
N 922 500
Note: The table shows the comparison of firms that participated in the Ifo “Financing of the German
Economy” survey (“Response”) and firms that did not return the questionnaire (“Non-response”); all
variables used to compare the two groups are drawn from the Ifo Investment Survey; p-values are reported
for a standard mean comparison t-test; employment is measured in heads; Influence Finance provides
a firm’s appraisal of the influence of the financing situation on investment in the current year with the
following answer categories: 1 Strong animation, 2 Little animation, 3 No influence, 4 Little slowdown,
5 Strong slowdown.
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Empirical Appendix
Table A.2: Features of main bank relationships
N Freq. Perc.
Long duration 1,610 1,374 85.34%
Personal support 1,610 1,067 66.27%
Short distance 1,610 845 52.48%
Company knowledge 1,610 694 43.11%
Difficult times 1,610 591 36.71%
Important creditor 1,610 514 31.93%
Others 1,610 39 2.42%
Note: For the two most important bank relationships, firms reported whether or not the different features
characterise the bank relationship and whether the bank is a main bank. Here, a data set of main bank
relationships is constructed. The dummy variables equal one if the respective feature is reported for the
respective main bank relationship.
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Table A.3: Baseline estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Information Reduction Availability Interest Maturities Collateral
Main bank (1) -0.1543*** 0.0017 -0.0371 -0.0990** -0.0547** -0.0789**
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Main bank (2) -0.1044** 0.0125 -0.0298 -0.1122*** -0.0455** -0.0472
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
log(Employees) 0.0066 0.0029 0.0203 0.0272* -0.0187 0.0191
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
log(Assets) 0.0086 0.0104 -0.0011 -0.0100 0.0132* -0.0036
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Equity 0.0025 -0.0341 -0.0462 -0.0422 -0.0004 -0.0375
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Long-term debt 0.0330 0.0299 0.0963 0.0645 -0.0204 0.0222
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06)
Cash -0.3082*** -0.0612 -0.1880** -0.1475* -0.0287 -0.2384***
(0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.08)
Return (3% to <7%) -0.0759** -0.0599*** -0.0394 -0.0782*** -0.0143 -0.0651**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Return (7% to <10%) -0.0416 -0.0846*** 0.0085 -0.0615* -0.0008 -0.0234
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Return (10% +) -0.0638 -0.0514* 0.0157 -0.0660 -0.0094 -0.0673*
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Earlypay (0% to <25%) -0.0114 0.0048 0.0037 0.0642 -0.0959 -0.0201
(0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10)
Earlypay (25% to <50%) -0.0294 0.0353 0.0143 -0.0309 -0.0751 -0.0029
(0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
Earlypay (50% to <75%) 0.0342 0.0331 0.0448 0.0542 -0.1312* 0.0067
(0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10)
Earlypay (75% +) -0.1058 -0.0463 -0.0763 -0.0657 -0.1124 -0.0770
(0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
log(Age) 0.0037 -0.0070 -0.0234 0.0178 0.0016 -0.0123
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Incorporated 0.0317 0.0188 0.0008 0.0657** 0.0017 0.0401
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Ext. rating -0.0114 -0.0127 0.0247 -0.0374 -0.0127 0.0204
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Group -0.0149 0.0013 0.0473 0.0286 0.0203 -0.0159
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Family 0.0196 0.0490 0.0491 -0.0083 0.0272 0.0638
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Export 0.0575 -0.0176 0.0267 0.0568* -0.0015 0.0121
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Concentration (10% to <30%) 0.0242 -0.0101 0.0282 0.0459 0.0277* 0.0387
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Concentration (30% to <50%) 0.0033 -0.0246 0.0307 -0.0118 0.0304 0.0534
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Concentration (50% +) 0.0286 -0.0130 -0.0095 0.0110 0.0357 0.0427
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Savings bank 0.0016 0.0191 0.0382 0.0184 0.0131 -0.0021
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Cooperative -0.0147 -0.0023 0.0029 0.0208 -0.0149 0.0187
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Landesbank -0.0072 -0.0346 -0.0371 0.0414 0.0073 -0.0634*
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Others 0.0097 -0.0194 -0.0216 0.0284 0.0017 0.0226
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.0522 0.0164 0.0441 0.1059 0.0183 0.0275
N 652 652 652 652 652 652
Note: The table shows OLS estimation results for regressions of dummy variables for different kinds of
impairments of credit finance due to the financial crisis on the number of main bank relationships, a set
of control variables for firm characteristics, bank classification dummy variables, and industry dummy
variables; the baseline category for the main bank relationship dummy variables is Main bank (0/3+);
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.4: Estimations of binary probit models
(1) (2) (3)
Information Reduction Availability
Main bank (1) -0.1176*** 0.0089 -0.0191
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Main bank (2) -0.0654** 0.0302 -0.0090
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Firm char. Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Bank class. Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.1638 0.1901 0.2087
N 643 497 576
(4) (5) (6)
Interest Maturities Collateral
Main bank (1) -0.0538** -0.0295** -0.0626**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Main bank (2) -0.0595*** -0.0139** -0.0314
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Firm char. Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Bank class. Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.2589 0.3100 0.1658
N 617 347 586
Note: The table shows the estimated binary probit marginal effects of the number of main bank rela-
tionships on the probability of facing different kinds of impairment of credit finance due to the financial
crisis; estimations include a set of control variables for firm characteristics, bank classification dummy
variables, and industry dummy variables; the baseline category for the main bank relationship dummy
variables is Main bank (0/3+); robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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Table A.5: Robustness check for reverse causality
(1) (2) (3)
Information Reduction Availability
Main bank (1) -0.1541*** 0.0046 -0.0059
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Main bank (2) -0.1001** 0.0097 -0.0028
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Firm char. Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Bank class. Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.0480 0.0066 0.0450
N 564 564 564
(4) (5) (6)
Interest Maturities Collateral
Main bank (1) -0.1143** -0.0599** -0.0755*
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Main bank (2) -0.1270*** -0.0555** -0.0392
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Firm char. Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Bank class. Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.0907 0.0232 0.0116
N 564 564 564
Note: Firms for which at least one of the two most important bank relationships has been established
in 2007 or later are dropped from the sample to rule out reverse causality concerns; the table shows
OLS estimations results for regressions of dummy variables for different kinds of impairments of credit
finance due to the financial crisis on the number of main bank relationships, a set of control variables for
firm characteristics, bank classification dummy variables, and industry dummy variables; the baseline
category for the main bank relationship dummy variables is Main bank (0/3+); robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.6: Robustness check using bank balance sheet variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Information Reduction Availability Interest Maturities Collateral
Main bank (1) -0.1438*** 0.0205 -0.0432 -0.1135*** -0.0495** -0.0516
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Main bank (2) -0.0918** 0.0279 -0.0249 -0.1138*** -0.0420* -0.0324
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
log(Bank assets)max -0.0034 -0.0094 0.0074 -0.0132 -0.0078 -0.0047
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
log(Bank assets)min -0.0034 0.0108 -0.0111 0.0017 0.0039 -0.0018
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Bank equitymax -0.0016 0.0013 0.0025 -0.0060** -0.0029* -0.0030
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Bank equitymin -0.0105 0.0019 -0.0025 -0.0017 -0.0002 0.0001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Bank liquiditymax 0.0088 0.3078** -0.1915 0.0745 0.0408 -0.1186
(0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.06) (0.13)
Bank liquiditymin 0.0226 -0.2984* -0.0763 0.1077 0.0119 -0.0246
(0.22) (0.18) (0.17) (0.21) (0.08) (0.19)
Bank depositsmax -0.1229 0.0913 -0.1840 0.0361 0.0625 0.0647
(0.15) (0.10) (0.12) (0.14) (0.08) (0.13)
Bank depositsmin 0.1042 -0.0855 0.1323 -0.0711 -0.0479 -0.1046
(0.17) (0.10) (0.14) (0.16) (0.09) (0.16)
Firm char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.0606 0.0450 0.0505 0.0959 0.0186 0.0319
N 649 649 649 649 649 649
Note: The table shows OLS estimation results for regressions of dummy variables for different kinds
of impairments of credit finance due to the financial crisis on the number of main bank relationships,
a set of control variables for firm characteristics, bank balance sheet variables, and industry dummy
variables; the baseline category for the main bank relationship dummy variables is Main bank (0/3+);
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.1: Purpose of negotiated credit
Purpose (line) Purpose (loan)
(N=531) (N=535)
Working capital 72.32% Substitution 47.57%
Investments 57.06% Enhancement 64.74%
Others 12.24% Rationalisation 28.17%
R&D 10.09%
Acquisitions 8.79%
Foreign investment 6.92%
Others 15.14%
Notes: The table provides the purposes of negotiated lines of credit and loans as reported by firms in
the Ifo “Financing of the German Economy” survey. For every negotiated credit contract, firms could
report more than one purpose.
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Table B.2: F&F finance and firm characteristics
F&F Business F&F Private
Yes No p > t Yes No p > t
N 128 956 62 1,009
Perc. 11.81% 88.19% 5.79% 94.21%
log(Empl) 4.57 5.02 0.01** 4.62 4.97 0.14
log(Assets) 8.61 9.25 0.009*** 9.12 9.16 0.90
log(Age) 3.96 4.05 0.32 3.82 4.06 0.06*
Incorporated 61.72% 62.41% 0.88 68.85% 61.74% 0.27
Ext. rating 25.00% 21.40% 0.36 25.00% 21.46% 0.52
Customer (< 10%) 20.00% 19.91% 0.98 11.48% 20.24% 0.10
Customer (10% to <30%) 41.60% 45.05% 0.47 44.26% 45.02% 0.91
Customer (30% to <50%) 26.40% 18.96% 0.05* 24.59% 19.44% 0.33
Customer (50% +) 12.00% 16.08% 0.24 19.67% 15.31% 0.36
Export 83.33% 88.22% 0.12 79.03% 88.04% 0.04**
Group 21.88% 39.79% 0.000*** 32.26% 38.10% 0.36
Family 91.41% 74.18% 0.000*** 62.90% 76.05% 0.02**
Control 70.22 73.69 0.21 70.26 73.85 0.34
Operating owner 72.66% 59.49% 0.004*** 59.68% 61.14% 0.82
Rating 216.21 198.46 0.04** 224.79 197.87 0.02**
Equity 21.89% 36.84% 0.000*** 16.47% 36.45% 0.000***
Debt 33.64% 23.14% 0.003*** 41.43% 23.54% 0.000***
Cash 9.61% 11.19% 0.30 8.16% 11.39% 0.12
Return (<3%) 54.31% 44.10% 0.04** 66.10% 44.05% 0.001***
Return (3 to <7%) 31.90% 32.65% 0.87 20.34% 32.79% 0.05*
Return (7 to <10%) 7.76% 14.32% 0.05* 8.47% 14.29% 0.21
Return (10% +) 6.03% 8.93% 0.30 5.08% 8.87% 0.32
Earlypay (0%) 4.10% 3.02% 0.52 6.56% 3.17% 0.16
Earlypay (<25%) 16.39% 14.55% 0.59 29.51% 13.60% 0.001***
Earlypay (25 to <50%) 7.38% 9.27% 0.49 6.56% 9.00% 0.52
Earlypay (50 to <75%) 14.75% 9.70% 0.08* 14.75% 10.02% 0.24
Earlypay (75% +) 57.38% 63.47% 0.19 42.62% 64.21% 0.001***
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for firm characteristics separately for F&F firms and non-
F&F firms; p-values are reported for t-tests of the significance of the difference between respective groups
of firms with respect to the firm characteristics; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.3: Probit estimations for IV approach
(1) (2)
Rejected (line) Rejected (loan)
Discretion -1.183*** -0.916***
(0.34) (0.30)
log(Empl) -0.305 -0.148
(0.22) (0.14)
log(Assets) 0.147 0.141
(0.17) (0.11)
log(Age) -0.183 -0.133
(0.14) (0.13)
Incorporated 1.048*** 0.409
(0.35) (0.27)
Ext. rating -0.521 -0.292
(0.34) (0.31)
Customer (10% to <30%) 0.514 -0.644*
(0.54) (0.35)
Customer (30% to <50%) -0.288 0.236
(0.62) (0.40)
Customer (50% +) 0.373 -0.478
(0.66) (0.45)
Group 0.478 0.125
(0.36) (0.34)
Family 0.037 -0.317
(0.35) (0.40)
Control 0.007 0.002
(0.00) (0.00)
Export -0.067 0.347
(0.44) (0.36)
Operating 1.086*** 0.973**
(0.37) (0.40)
Rating 0.001 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
Equity -1.157* -1.493**
(0.61) (0.64)
Long-term debt -1.355** 0.056
(0.61) (0.56)
Cash 5.849*** 2.829**
(1.82) (1.22)
Return (3% to <7%) -1.357*** -0.690**
(0.37) (0.28)
Return (7% to <10%) 0.279 0.187
(0.42) (0.39)
Return (10% +) -1.090 .
(1.12) .
Earlypay (0% to <25%) -0.014 -0.277
(0.51) (0.51)
Earlypay (25% to <50%) 0.343 -0.316
(0.58) (0.58)
Earlypay (50% to <75%) -0.827 -0.856
(0.63) (0.57)
Earlypay (75% +) -1.232** -1.109**
(0.56) (0.49)
Industry Yes Yes
N 235 231
Notes: The table shows results for two separate probit estimations; firm characteristics comprise all
variables listed in Table 2.3; industry dummy variables are included based on two-digit WZ 2008
industry classifications; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Table B.4: Sample selection in OLS estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
F&F F&F F&F F&F F&F F&F
Business Business Private Private
Rejected (line) 0.053 0.007 0.073
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Rejected (loan) 0.176* 0.093 0.161*
(0.09) (0.06) (0.08)
λ1 -0.059 0.219 -0.095
(0.19) (0.14) (0.17)
λ2 0.124 0.137 -0.044
(0.34) (0.22) (0.28)
Firm char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.1472 0.1114 0.1439 0.1318 0.1511 0.1350
N 286 307 276 302 281 303
Notes: The table shows results for six separate OLS estimations; firm characteristics comprise all control
variables listed in Table 2.3; industry dummy variables are included based on the two-digit WZ 2008
industry classification; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Table B.5: Sample selection in IV estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
F&F F&F F&F F&F F&F F&F
Business Business Private Private
Rejected (line) 0.236 0.097 0.077
(0.20) (0.16) (0.17)
Rejected (loan) 0.682** 0.495** 0.472*
(0.31) (0.22) (0.25)
λ1 -0.149 0.187 -0.145
(0.22) (0.15) (0.18)
λ2 -0.292 -0.308 -0.282
(0.39) (0.27) (0.33)
Firm char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 35.16*** 15.99*** 34.85*** 13.07*** 32.47*** 15.82***
MES 36.08*** 19.43*** 35.13*** 17.03*** 35.54*** 18.43***
N 234 225 225 220 230 222
Note: The table shows results for separate IV estimations; λ is the inverse Mills ratio from probit
estimations for the firms’ decision to enter bank credit negotiations; firm characteristics comprise all
control variables listed in Table 2.3; industry dummy variables are included based on the two-digit WZ
2008 industry classification; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01; F is the F-statistic for the first-stage estimation testing the significance of the instrumental
variable; MES provides the minimum eigenvalue statistic for the Stock and Yogo (2005) test with ***
indicating the 10 percent confidence level and ** indicating the 15 percent confidence level.
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Table B.6: OLS estimations for discouraged borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
F&F F&F F&F F&F F&F F&F
Business Business Private Private
Discouraged (line) 0.285 0.267 0.061
(0.22) (0.19) (0.12)
Discouraged (loan) 0.126 0.104 0.049
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10)
λ1 -0.162 -0.032 -0.147
(0.10) (0.04) (0.10)
λ2 0.151 0.119 -0.049
(0.22) (0.15) (0.18)
Firm char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.1707 0.1893 0.2441 0.3084 0.1391 0.1347
N 314 306 314 302 310 301
Notes: The table shows OLS estimation results for separate regressions; λ is the inverse Mills ratio
from probit estimations for the firms’ decision not to enter bank credit negotiations; firm characteristics
comprise all control variables listed in Table 2.3; industry dummy variables are included based on the
two-digit WZ 2008 industry classification; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Appendix A: The Timing of the Treatment
As of 2008, the bank lending supply question in the Ifo Business Survey is asked on
a monthly basis. This allows the exact specification of the treatment month t as the
month in which the firm first reports restrictive bank lending after reporting normal
or accommodating bank lending in previous surveys. From 2003 to 2008, however, the
question was asked only twice a year, in March and August. If, for example, a firm
reports normal or accommodating bank lending in March and restrictive bank lending
in August, it is unclear whether the shift has occurred in August or in a month between
March and August.
For our analysis, we assume the treatment month t to be the month right after the firm
reports “normal” or “accommodating” bank lending the last time (which would be April
in this example). This ensures that our control variables, which are drawn from t-1, are
measured in a month in which the firm is definitely untreated and not already affected
by constrained credit supply.
Alternatively, we could assume that the treatment occurs in the month in which the firm
reports “restrictive” bank lending the first time. We have re-run our whole analysis based
on this alternative specification and found our results to be insensitive to a variation of
the timing assumption.
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Appendix B: Discussion of Annual Frequency in Employment
Data
In the Ifo Business Survey firms report their employment figures in November of each
year. Two extreme alternatives are available to link annual employment growth rates
to monthly data, each leading to severe problems in the estimation of credit supply-side
effects on firm-level employment growth.
Alternative 1: Put the number of employees in November into every subsequent month
until a new figure becomes available in November of the following year and calculate
year-on-year growth rates in every month.
Problem: If a firm receives the treatment of constrained credit supply (as defined in
Section 3.3.2) in October 2008, for example, the employment growth rate in t+12 (i.e.
October 2009) contains the growth between November 2007 and November 2008, which
obviously captures a large extent of what is in fact pre-treatment growth, but only one
month of post-treatment growth. Estimated credit-supply side effects on firm-level em-
ployment growth would therefore be potentially biased.
Alternative 2: Put the number of employees in November into every previous month
until an old figure in November of the previous year appears and calculate year-on-year
growth rates in every month.
Problem: If a firm receives the treatment of constrained credit supply (as defined in
Section 3.3.2) in December 2008, for example, the employment growth rate in t+12 (i.e.
December 2009) contains the growth between November 2009 and November 2010, which
captures only a very small part of the post-treatment year. Estimated credit-supply side
effects on firm-level employment growth would again be potentially biased.
Our solution: We put the number of employees in November into the five previous and
six subsequent months and calculate year-on-year growth rates in every month. For some
observations, this may still not capture post-treatment employment growth precisely, but
this intermediate solution is the most conservative way to deal with the problem.
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Appendix C: Empirical Appendix
Figure 3.1: Number of treated firms over time
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Notes: The graph shows the number of firms that are treated in every quarter; a firm is treated if it
reports “restrictive” bank lending after having reported “normal” or “accommodating” bank lending in
the previous 12 months; from 2003 to 2008, treatments can occur only in the second and third quarter
because firms are surveyed on bank lending only in March and August and the treatment is assumed to
occur in the month right after “normal” or “accommodating” bank lending was last reported.
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Table C.1: Balancing properties for the two matching procedures
(1) (2)
(NR = 223; NU = 1, 351) (NR = 141; NU = 806)
t-1 X¯R−X¯U p > t Bias X¯R−X¯U p > t Bias
Firm size
log(Empl) -9.5 0.40 -7.82 -4.7 0.74 -3.94
log(Assets) -9.4 0.54 -5.70 -5.6 0.77 -3.48
Balance sheet data
Equity -1.5% 0.47 -6.24 -0.7% 0.80 -2.88
Cash -0.7% 0.54 -5.24 -1.0% 0.54 -7.74
Long-term debt 1.7% 0.36 9.07 1.4% 0.54 7.73
Short-term debt 1.1% 0.59 3.31 0.5% 0.85 1.48
Cash flow -0.5% 0.71 -3.72 0.0% 1.00 0.07
ROA 0.4% 0.91 0.99 0.2% 0.97 0.42
Interest Coverage -0.49 0.89 -1.11 -4.07 0.36 -9.53
Current business situation
State (+) -1.5% 0.71 -3.49 -0.2% 0.96 -0.58
State (-) 6.8% 0.10 15.87 2.3% 0.66 5.42
Orders (+) -3.2% 0.29 -9.81 -1.9% 0.58 -5.96
Orders (-) 3.2% 0.48 6.77 2.8% 0.63 5.78
Production (+) 2.2% 0.45 6.53 -1.6% 0.60 -4.69
Production (-) 0.6% 0.88 1.48 0.2% 0.98 0.37
Short-time 3.1% 0.30 8.86 -1.8% 0.60 -5.13
Export -1.8% 0.55 -5.52 0.2% 0.95 0.68
Future expectations
Business expect (+) -0.3% 0.94 -0.67 0.2% 0.96 0.56
Business expect (-) 2.8% 0.51 6.66 2.4% 0.66 5.60
Empl expect (+) -1.3% 0.54 -5.53 -0.6% 0.76 -2.71
Empl expect (-) 3.4% 0.39 8.56 0.8% 0.86 2.03
Headcount (+) -0.9% 0.70 -3.68 0.2% 0.95 0.72
Headcount (-) 6.4% 0.13 15.04 4.2% 0.42 9.87
Short-time expect 2.3% 0.52 5.91 -2.5% 0.59 -6.17
Notes: Sample (1) is derived from ten nearest neighbours matching on firm size and balance sheet
variables only; Sample (2) is derived from ten nearest neighbours matching on firm size, balance sheet
variables, current business situation, and future expectations; differences in means between restricted and
unrestricted firms are reported for pre-treatment control variables Bi,t−1, Ci,t−1, and Fi,t−1; p-values are
reported for t-tests with H0: X¯R = X¯U ; bias statistics are calculated as (X¯R − X¯U )/
√
σ2
R
+σ2
U
2 following
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985).
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Table C.2: Alternative OLS estimations using Slowdowni,t+12
(1) (2) βB1 − βBCF1
Restricted 0.0887*** 0.0737*** 0.015***
(0.026) (0.026)
Firm size Yes Yes
Balance sheet data Yes Yes
Current situation No Partly
Future expectations No Partly
Month Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.1683 0.1895
N 5,503 5,503
Notes: The table provides results for OLS estimations of Slowdowni,t+12 on the treatment status
Restrictedi,t and different sets of pre-treatment control variables; standard errors (reported in parenthe-
ses) are clustered at the firm-level; “Firm size”, “Balance sheet data”, “Current situation”, and “Future
expectations” are reduced sets of control variables (excluding general appraisals) as explained in Section
3.5.1; industry dummy variables are included based on the two-digit WZ 2008 industry classification;
the two samples contain only those observations for which all control variables of Estimation (2) are
available; the third column provides the difference between the two estimated effects; its significance is
tested using a t-test with H0: βB1 = βBCF1 based on Clogg, Petkova, and Haritou (1995); * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.3: Alternative PSM estimations using Slowdowni,t+12
(1) (2) βB1 − βBCF1
Restricted 5.74%** 3.16% 2.58%
(0.0225) (0.0241)
Industry Yes Yes
Firm size Yes Yes
Balance sheet data Yes Yes
Current situation No Partly
Future expectations No Partly
p>t 0.01 0.19
Upper bound 9.44% 7.12%
Lower bound 2.03% -0.80%
Treated obs. 245 214
Matching obs. 1,516 1,298
Notes: The table provides results for WLS estimations of Slowdowni,t+12 on the treatment status
Restrictedi,t; in Estimation (1), weights are derived from PSM based on firm size and balance sheet
data in t-1; in Estimation (2), weights are derived from PSM based on firm size, balance sheet data,
and reduced sets of control variables (excluding general appraisals) for current business situation and
future expectations as explained in Section 3.5.1; industry dummy variables based on the two-digit WZ
2008 industry classification are also included in all PSM estimations; p-values are reported for a t-test of
significance the estimated treatment effect; the significance of the difference between the two estimated
effects in the third column cannot be tested; upper and lower bounds are reported for the 95 percent
confidence interval; standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.4: OLS estimations using Slowdown_avgi,t+12
(1) (2) βB1 − βBCF1
Restricted 0.0545*** 0.0477*** 0.068**
(0.010) (0.010)
Firm size Yes Yes
Balance sheet data Yes Yes
Current situation No Yes
Future expectations No Yes
Month Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.2258 0.3041
N 5,193 5,193
Notes: The table provides results for OLS estimations of Slowdown_avgi,t+12 on the treatment status
Restrictedi,t and different sets of pre-treatment control variables; standard errors (reported in parenthe-
ses) are clustered at the firm-level; “Firm size”, “Balance sheet data”, “Current situation”, and “Future
expectations” are sets of control variables as listed in Table 3.1; industry dummy variables are included
based on the two-digit WZ 2008 industry classification; the two samples contain only those observations
for which all control variables of Estimation (2) are available; the third column provides the difference
between the two estimated effects; its significance is tested using a t-test with H0: βB1 = βBCF1 based
on Clogg, Petkova, and Haritou (1995); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.5: PSM estimations using Slowdown_avgi,t+12
(1) (2) βB1 − βBCF1
Restricted 3.78%*** 2.78%* 1.01%
(0.0116) (0.0149)
Industry Yes Yes
Firm size Yes Yes
Balance sheet data Yes Yes
Current situation No Yes
Future expectations No Yes
p>t 0.001 0.06
Upper bound 5.69% 5.23%
Lower bound 1.88% 0.33%
Treated obs. 223 141
Matching obs. 1,351 806
Notes: The table provides results for WLS estimations of Slowdown_avgi,t+12 on the treatment status
Restrictedi,t; in Estimation (1), weights are derived from PSM based on firm size and balance sheet data
in t-1; in Estimation (2), weights are derived from PSM based on firm size, balance sheet data, current
business situation, and future expectations in t-1; industry dummy variables based on the two-digit WZ
2008 industry classification are also included in all PSM estimations; p-values are reported for a t-test of
significance of the estimated treatment effect; the significance of the difference between the two estimated
effects in the third column cannot be tested; upper and lower bounds are reported for the 95 percent
confidence interval; standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.6: OLS estimations using ∆Empli,t+12
(1) (2) βB1 − βBCF1
Restricted -0.0180*** -0.0152** 0.0025**
(0.006) (0.006)
Firm size Yes Yes
Balance sheet data Yes Yes
Current situation No Yes
Future expectations No Yes
Month Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.0598 0.0849
N 5,041 5,041
Notes: The table provides results for OLS estimations of ∆Empli,t+12 on the treatment status
Restrictedi,t and different sets of pre-treatment control variables; standard errors (reported in parenthe-
ses) are clustered at the firm-level; “Firm size”, “Balance sheet data”, “Current situation”, and “Future
expectations” are sets of control variables as listed in Table 3.1; industry dummy variables are included
based on the two-digit WZ 2008 industry classification; the two samples contain only those observations
for which all control variables of Estimation (2) are available; the third column provides the difference
between the two estimated effects; its significance is tested using a t-test with H0: βB1 = βBCF1 based
on Clogg, Petkova, and Haritou (1995); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.7: PSM estimations using ∆Empli,t+12
(1) (2) βB1 − βBCF1
Restricted -1.08%* 0.35% -1.43%
(0.0059) (0.0078)
Industry Yes Yes
Firm size Yes Yes
Balance sheet data Yes Yes
Current situation No Yes
Future expectations No Yes
p>t 0.07 0.65
Upper bound -0.11% 1.64%
Lower bound -2.04% -0.94%
Treated obs. 208 130
Matching obs. 1,295 773
Notes: The table provides results for WLS estimations of ∆Empli,t+12 on the treatment status
Restrictedi,t; in Estimation (1), weights are derived from PSM based on firm size and balance sheet
data in t-1; in Estimation (2), weights are derived from PSM based on firm size, balance sheet data,
current business situation, and future expectations in t-1; industry dummy variables based on the two-
digit WZ 2008 industry classification are also included in all PSM estimations; p-values are reported for
a t-test of significance of the estimated treatment effect; the significance of the difference between the
two estimated effects in the third column cannot be tested; upper and lower bounds are reported for the
95 percent confidence interval; standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Table C.8: OLS estimations using Empl_Decreasei,t+12
(1) (2) βB1 − βBCF1
Restricted 0.0937*** 0.0749*** 0.0188***
(0.027) (0.026)
Firm size Yes Yes
Balance sheet data Yes Yes
Current situation No Yes
Future expectations No Yes
Month Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.0881 0.1263
N 5,141 5,141
Notes: The table provides results for OLS estimations of Empl_Decreasei,t+12 on the treatment status
Restrictedi,t and different sets of pre-treatment control variables; standard errors (reported in parenthe-
ses) are clustered at the firm-level; “Firm size”, “Balance sheet data”, “Current situation”, and “Future
expectations” are sets of control variables as listed in Table 3.1; industry dummy variables are included
based on the two-digit WZ 2008 industry classification; the two samples contain only those observations
for which all control variables of Estimation (2) are available; the third column provides the difference
between the two estimated effects; its significance is tested using a t-test with H0: βB1 = βBCF1 based
on Clogg, Petkova, and Haritou (1995); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.9: PSM estimation using Empl_Decreasei,t+12
(1) (2) βB1 − βBCF1
Restricted 6.23%** 1.24% 4.99%
(0.0250) (0.0324)
Industry Yes Yes
Firm size Yes Yes
Balance sheet data Yes Yes
Current situation No Yes
Future expectations No Yes
p>t 0.01 0.70
Upper bound 10.34% 6.56%
Lower bound 2.13% -4.08%
Treated obs. 221 136
Matching obs. 1,340 792
Notes: The table provides results for WLS estimations of Empl_Decreasei,t+12 on the treatment status
Restrictedi,t; in Estimation (1), weights are derived from PSM based on firm size and balance sheet data
in t-1; in Estimation (2), weights are derived from PSM based on firm size, balance sheet data, current
business situation, and future expectations in t-1; industry dummy variables based on the two-digit WZ
2008 industry classification are also included in all PSM estimations; p-values are reported for a t-test
of the significance of the estimated treatment effect; the significance of the difference between the two
estimated effects in the third column cannot be tested; upper and lower bounds are reported for the
95 percent confidence interval; standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
Table C.10: Treated firms in different matched samples
(1) (2)
X¯B X¯BCF p > t
Production (t+12)
Slowdown 70.0% 71.6% 0.73
Slowdown_avg 23.4% 24.1% 0.80
Employment (t+12)
∆Empl -1.0% -0.3% 0.56
Empl_Decrease 45.2% 41.9% 0.54
Notes: The table provides the means of all outcome variables for treated firms in the matched sample
when matching on firm size and balance sheet variables in t-1 and the matched sample when matching on
all variables in t-1; p-values are provided for a two-group mean comparison test with H0: X¯B = X¯BCF .
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Table C.11: Financial crisis OLS estimations using Slowdowni,t+12
Restricted 0.0731** 0.0587* 0.0144*
(0.032) (0.031)
Firm size Yes Yes
Balance sheet data Yes Yes
Current situation No Yes
Future expectations No Yes
Month Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
,
Adj. R2 0.2086 0.2552
N 3,315 3,315
Notes: The table provides results for OLS estimations of Slowdowni,t+12 on the treatment status
Restrictedi,t and different sets of pre-treatment control variables in the subsample as of July 2007;
standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the firm-level; “Firm size”, “Balance sheet
data”, “Current situation”, and “Future expectations” are sets of control variables as listed in Table 3.1;
industry dummy variables are included based on the two-digit WZ 2008 industry classification; the two
samples contain only those observations for which all control variables of Estimation (2) are available;
the third column provides the difference between the two estimated effects; its significance is tested using
a t-test with H0: βB1 = βBCF1 based on Clogg, Petkova, and Haritou (1995); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Table C.12: Financial crisis PSM estimation using Slowdowni,t+12
(1) (2) βB1 − βBCF1
Restricted 4.97%* 3.84% 1.14%
(0.0260) (0.0306)
Industry Yes Yes
Firm size Yes Yes
Balance sheet data Yes Yes
Current situation No Yes
Future expectations No Yes
p>t 0.06 0.21
Upper bound 9.25% 8.87%
Lower bound 0.70% -1.20%
Treated obs. 160 116
Matching obs. 928 690
Notes: The table provides results for WLS estimations of Slowdowni,t+12 on the treatment status
Restrictedi,t in the subsample as of July 2007; in Estimation (1), weights are derived from PSM based
on firm size and balance sheet data in t-1; in Estimation (2), weights are derived from PSM based on
firm size, balance sheet data, current business situation, and future expectations in t-1; industry dummy
variables based on the two-digit WZ 2008 industry classification are also included in all PSM estimations;
p-values are reported for a t-test of significance of the estimated treatment effect; the significance of the
difference between the two estimated effects in the third column cannot be tested; upper and lower
bounds are reported for the 95 percent confidence interval; standard errors are reported in parentheses;
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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